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INTRODUCTION

On November 30, 1993, President William Jefferson Clinton signed
legislation to create a five-day waiting period and background check for
the purchase of handguns. 2 The signing ceremony for the so-called Brady
bill capped a fierce, seven-year, legislative battle between gun control

' With apologies to Shakespeare: "There is, betwixt that smile we would aspire to/ That sweet
aspect of princes ...." WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HENRY Vlll act 3, sc. 2.
2
See Thomas L. Friedman, Clinton Signs Bill on Guns into Law, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 1, 1993, at
A20. Technically, the waiting period was five government working days.
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advocates and grass-roots gun owner groups such as the National Rifle
Association. However, no sooner did the Brady bill become law than the
fighting moved to a new arena: federal courts. Throughout the country
lawsuits were filed as the Brady law's provisions took effect, charging that
Congress had overstepped its constitutional bounds. 3
While the congressional debate over the Brady Act focused on the
wisdom, or lack thereof, of federal gun control laws, and their legitimacy
under the Second Amendment, 4 the court challenges to the Brady Act
focused on something altogether different: the proper distribution of power
between state and local authorities and the federal government. Printz v.
United State~ was not a case about gun control, it was a case about
federal power. On these grounds, the Supreme Court found the Brady Act
unconstitutional and the sweep of federal power over state and local
governments to be limited.
The Printz decision came on the heels of two other important challenges to federal authority, New York v. United Statei and United States
v. Lopez.7 In all three, a majority on the Court recognized that the Constitution created a federal government of limited powers and reserved a
substantial degree of state autonomy. "Dual sovereignty," which ensures a
balance of federal and state power, is an essential component of the
federalist system. Reports of federalism's death were exaggerated. 8
The revival of federalism could have profound implications for
environmental protection. Because most federal environmental laws rely L11
some degree upon the states for their implementation, one fmds all of the
conflicts and cooperative ventures that characterize the federal-state

3
See, e.g., Mack v. United States, 856 F. Supp. 1372 (D. Ariz. 1994); Printz v. United States,
854 F. Supp 1503 (D. Mont 1994).
4
Although the Supreme Court has never invalidated a gun control law on Second Amendment
grounds, there is substantial scholarship to suggest that it should. See David B. Kopel & Christopher

C. Little, Communitarians, Neorepublicans, and Guns: Assessing the Case for Fireanns Prohibition,
56 MD. L. REv. 438,516-25 (1997); see also STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, THAT EVERY MAN BE ARMED:
THE EVOLUTION OF A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT (2d ed. 1994); JOYCE LEE MALCOLM, TO KEEP AND
BEAR ARMs: THE ORIGINS OF AN ANGLO-AMERICAN RIGHT (1994); Robert J. Cottrol & Raymond T.
Diamond, The Second Amendment: Toward an Afro-Americanist Reconsideration, 80 GEO. L.J. 309
(1991); William Van Alstyne, The Second Amendment and the Personal Right to Anns, 43 DUKE L.J.
1236 (1994). But see Carl T. Bogus, Race, Riots, and Guns, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 1365 (1993);
Lawrence Delbert Cress, An Armed Community: The Origins and Meaning of the Right to Bear Anns,
71 J. AM. H!ST. 22 (1984); David C. Williams, Civic Republicanism and the Citizen Militia: The
Terrifying Second Amendment, 101 YALE LJ. 551 (1991).
' 117 S. Ct 2365 (1997) .
• 505 u.s. 144 (1992).
7
514 U.S. 549 (1995). Several other recent cases reinforce the revival of federalism. See infra
note 95.
' The Garcia dissent began: 'Tflhis decision substantialiy alters the federal system embodied in
the Constitution .... "Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528,557 (1985) (Powell,
I., dissenting).
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relationship in contemporary environmental policy. Indeed, much of what
is considered "federal" environmenta1 protection is administered by the
states.9 State cooperation, however, is not always willing; federal environmental statutes often include measures to induce state cooperation. 10 Thus,
any constitutional jurisprudence that limits the ability of Congress to set
national policy for the states will reverberate through environmental policy.
This Comment reviews the Printz decision in the context of the
Supreme Court's recent federalism jurisprudence and assesses its implications for environmenta1 law. Part I provides a brief historical overview
of the federal-state relationship in the environmental context and recent
Supreme Court decisions on federalism. Part II discusses and evaluates the
Printz decision. Part ill applies the Supreme Court holdings in Printz and
related federalism cases to current environmenta1 policies and identifies
federal environmental programs that are constitutionally suspect. Finally,
Part N addresses the public policy concern that limiting the federal
government's power in the environmenta] context will inevitably weaken
environmental protection.
I.

BACKGROUND

"So much political power has been reallocated to the federal government that, at times, the states could be mistaken for vassals of the federal
government." 11
A.

The Federal-State Relationship in the Environmental Context

The current federal-state environmental framework developed in the
1970s as environmenta1 protection became a national political concem. 12
Prior to that time, environmental protection was largely the responsibility
of state and local governments, occasionally augmented by federal common law. 13 Although federal funding of environmental research and staie-

9

See infra Part I.A.
States and localities have vigorously protested federal impositions. Some have even gone to
court challenging federal environmental rules. See infra Parts I.A, m.c.
11
John P. Dwyer, The Practice of Federalism Under the Clean Air Act, 54 MD. L. REv. 1183,
1185 (1995) (emphasis added).
12
A brief history of these developments can be found in JONATIIAN H. ADLER, ENVIRONMENTALISM AT TiiE CROSSROADS 21-24 (1995) [hereinafter ADLER, ENVIRONMENTAUSM]. For a more detailed
discussion of the environmental movement's history, see RILEY E. DUNLAP & ANGElA G. MERTIG,
AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAUSM: THE U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL MoVEMENT: 1970-1990 (1992); PHiLIP
SHABECOfF, A FIERCE GREEN FIRE: THE AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT (1993).
13
See Robert V. Percival, Environmental Federalism: Historical Roots and Contemporary
Models, 54 MD. L. REv. 1141, 1148, 1152-60 (1995).
10
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level pollution control efforts began in the late 1940s, such efforts were
relatively minor. 14 The federal regulations of that era dealt with federal
agencies or uniquely federal concerns, such as keeping navigable waterways free from obstructions. 15
The federal presence in environmental policy exploded in the 1970s.
Beginning in 1969, Congress enacted a series of sweeping federal statutes
to regulate environmental quality at the national level, including the
National Environmental Policy Act (1969), 16 the Clean Air Act (1970), 17
the Clean Water Act (1972), 18 the Endangered Species Act (1973), 19 the
Safe Drinking Water Act (1974)/0 the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and
Rodenticide Act (1975),21 the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
(1976), 22 and the Toxic Substances Control Act (1976), 23 among others.
Yet, the federal government does not implement environmental protection
on its own. Rather, most major federal environmental statutes establish
environmental standards at the national level but encourage a significant
degree of enforcement and implementation at the state or locallevel.24
Most of the early environmental laws seemed to work well. During
the 1970s and 1980s, many indicators of environmental quality showed
distinct improvement. 25 Federal regulations undoubtedly played a role in
this improvement, as did other factors. 26 In recent years, however, con-

14
Though minor, financial assistance to local governments for environmental matters was still
controversial. In 1956, President Eisenhower vetoed funding for municipal sewage treatment plants
because such concerns were "strictly local." Congress then overrode Eisenhower's veto. See id. at
1155-56.
" "To the extent that federal law was regolatory in character prior to 1970, the primary targets
of envi.ronmentai reguiation were federal agencies rather than private industry." ld. at 1158. For
example, the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act of 1958 was primarily concerned with ensuring that
federal projects did not unduly impact wildlife. See Pub. L. No. 85-624, 72 Stat. 563 (1958) (codified
as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 661-667e (1994)).
16
42 u.s.c. §§ 4321-4347 (1994).
17
42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-766lf. Note, the first federal clean air legislation was passed in 1955 (Pub.
L. No. 80-159), with subsequent amendments in 1963, 1965, 1966, and 1967. However, it is common
to speak of the Clean Air Act as a 1970 law since that is when the current federal regolatory structure
was put in place.
" 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1385 (1994). The Clean Water Act is formally known as the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act
19
16 u.s.c. §§ 1531-1544 (1994).
20
42 u.s.c. §§ 300f-300j (1994).
21
7 u.s.c. §§ 136-136y (1994).
22
42 u.s.c. §§ 6901-6992k (1994).
23
15 u.s.c. §§ 2601·2671 (1994).
24
See Percival, supra note 13, at ll74.
25
See, e.g., Jonathan Adler & Peter Cazamias, Benchmarks: The Ecological and Economic Trends
that Are Shaping the Natural Environment and Human Societies, in THE TRUE STAlE OF TilE PLANET
393, 438-453 (Ron Bailey ed., 1995); BORIS DEWEll. ET AL., INDEX OF LEADING ENviRONMENTAL
INDICATORS FOR TilE U.S. AND CANADA (1997).
26
See Indur Goklany, Richer Is Cleaner, in TRUE STArn, supra note 25, at 339. According to one
prominent environmental analyst, "[t]he fact that at least some measures of air quality were improving
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cerns have increased about the ability of a national, centralized regulatory
structure to address environmental problems that are largely local and
regional in nature. According to the United States Advisory Commission
on Intergovernmental Relations, "federal rules and procedures governing
decision-making for protecting the environment often are complex, conflicting, difficult to apply, adversarial, costly, inflexible and uncertain."27
In 1995, the National Academy of Public Administration concluded that
"EPA and Congress need to hand more responsibility and decision-making
authority over to the states."28 Today, it is increasingly recognized that
"the system has grown to the point where it amounts to nothing less than
a massive effort at Soviet-style planning of the economy to achieve
environmental goals."29
In this context, it should be no surprise that "national environmental
policy has surged to the forefront of contemporary federalism debates due
to the growth of federal environmental regulation."30 Thus, as the Supreme Court breathes new life into regulatory federalism, environmental
policy will feel the impact-indeed it already has. 31
I.

Cooperative Federalism

Most major federal environmental laws that do not empower federal
agencies to regulate environmental impacts directly follow a model of
"cooperative federalism," in which the federal government outlines a
regulatory program, and then entices states to implement the program in
lieu of the federal government. State implementation is typically subject to
federal approval, and may receive limited funding from the national

at an impressive rate before 1970 suggests that other factors in addition to the [Clean Air Act] are behind ... recent improvements." Paul Portney, Air Pollution Policy, in PuBuc POLICIES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECI10N 51 (Paul Portney ed., 1990).
A good example of dramatic environmental improvement that cannot be attributed to federal
regulatory programs is the increased rate of wetland restoration and conservation in the late 1980s and
1990s such that by 1997 one could claim that the United States achieved the official policy goal of "no
net loss." This trend is primarily the result of private efforts and voluntary, incentive-based programs,
such as the North American Waterfowl Management Plan and Partners for Wildlife. See JONATHAN
ToLMAN, SWAMPED: How AMERICA ACIDEVED 'No NET Loss' (CEI 1997).
21
U.S. ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, INTERGOVERNMENTAL
DECISIONMAKING FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECI10N AND PuBLIC WORKS 1 (1992), cited in Percival,
supra note 13, at II65.
28
NATIONAL ACADEMY OF PuB. ADMIN., SETIING PRIORITIES, GETIING REsULTS: A NEW DIRECTION FOR THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECI10N AGENCY (1995), cited in NATIONAL ACADEMY OF PuB.
ADMIN., REsOLVING THE PARADOX OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECI10N 5 (1997).
29
Richard B. Stewart, Controlling Environmental Risks Through Economic Incentives, 13 COLUM.
J. ENVTJ... L. 153, 154 (1988).
30
Percival, supra note 13, at Il4l.
" See infra Part ill.A.
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treasury. Typically, states must show they can administer the given
program in accordance with federal guidelines. Requirements can range
from local pollution control measures and guidelines for consideration of
permit applications to criminal enforcement policies and state rules on
standing for citizen suits. While each state may tailor its program to
particular state needs, to gain federal approval all states must operate within the constraints outlined in federal law or regulation. 32 Commentators
often refer to cooperative federalism as a "partnership" between the state
and federal governments, albeit an unequal one.33
According to Adam Babich, former editor of the Environmental Law
Reporter, "[t]he essence of cooperative federalism is that states take
primary responsibility for implementing federal standards, while retaining
the freedom to apply their own, more stringent standards."34 The alternative for states is federal preemption of their programs and, in some cases,
the imposition of federal sanctions, such as a cutoff of federal highway
funds or increased regulatory requirements. Statutes which embody this
approach include the Clean Air Act, 35 the Clean Water Act/6 the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 37 portions of the Safe Drinking
Water Act, 38 and the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act. 39
There are three reasons typically given for adopting the cooperative
federalism model. 40 First, the federal government could not hope to
implement all environmental regulatory programs on its own. "The federal
government ... is dependent upon state and local authorities to implement
these policies because of the nation's size and geographic diversity, the
close interrelation between environmental controls and local land use deci-

32
"In most environmental statutes, Congress has reserved a substantial role for states, particularly
in the implementation and enforcement of federal standards, but Congress has kept most of the
fundamental policy-making authority for itself or the federal agencies." John Dwyer, The Practice of
Federalism Under the Clean Air Act, 54 MD. L. REv. 1183, 1184 (1995).
" See id. at 1190 ("Although the states are by no means equal partners in regulating the
environment, they paradoxically remain indispensable partners.'').
34
Adam Babich, Our Federalism, Our Hazardous Waste, and Our Good Fortune, 54 MD. L.
REv. 1516, 1534 (1995). In Babich's model, successful cooperative federalism requires that the federal
government observe five principles: "(1) provide for state implementation; (2) set clear standards; (3)
reflect respect for state autonomy; (4) provide mechanisms to police the process; and (5) apply the
same rules to government and private parties." Id.
" 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-766lf (1994).
J6 33 u.s.c. §§ 1251-1385 (1994).
J7 42 u.s.c. §§ 6901-6992k (1994).
J8 ld. §§ 300f-300j.
" 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (1994). See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n,
452 U.S. 264 (1981) (holding that the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act is a constitutional
example of cooperative federalism).
"' See Dwyer, supra note 32, at 1217; Percival, supra note 13, at 1174-75; see generally DENISE

SCHEBERLE, FEDERALISM AND ENVIRONMENTAL POUCY: TRUST AND TilE POLITICS OF IMPLEMENTATION

(1997).
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sions, and federal officials' limited implementation and enforcement
resources."41 Since the 1970s, analysts have recognized that centralized
federal environmental regulation is destined to fail insofar as it fails to
enlist support at the state and local level; 42 "[t]he inadequacy of federal
resources in comparison to the magnitude of environmental problems
inevitably results in federal dependence on state and local authorities."43
Second, environmental concerns and potential solutions are not the
same throughout the United States. To succeed in a given locale, environmental policies must be tailored to local conditions. Due to their familiarity
with state and local conditions, state and local officials are apt to have
local expertise that is unobtainable by national agencies. 44 John Dwyer
notes that "[t]he knowledge necessary to administer any air pollution control program ... can be found only at the local level."45 The relative
sources and composition of urban air pollution varies from place to place.
The nature of air pollution concerns in Phoenix, Arizona, differs from that
in Atlanta, Georgia. 46 Much the same can be said for virtually every
pollution control issue. 47
Finally comes politics. Environmental programs, insofar as they seek
to regulate land-use, lifestyles and local economic activity, are inevitably
controversial. Without local political support, federal environmental officials fmd implementing environmental programs extremely difficult. 48 Yet
insofar as the federal government enlists state and local officials to
cooperate, local concerns about federal intrusions into local matters diminish. Federal officials will also gain the benefit of having state and local

41
Richard B. Stewan, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating State Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE LJ. II96, ll96 (1977).
42
Some would argue that it is destined to fail regardless. See Fred L. Smith, Jr., Markets and the
Environment: A Critical Reappraisal, 13 CONTEMP. EcoN. PoL'Y 62 (1995) [hereinafter Smith, A
Critical Reappraisal].
43
See Stewan, supra note 41, at 1201.
44
This is essentially the Hayekian argument about the impossibility of centralizing infonnation.
See generally F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AMER. EcON. REv. 519 (1945). Of
course, Hayek might be skeptical about the ability to centralize infonnation at the state level as well.
45
Dwyer, supra note 32, at 1218.
46
See NATIONAL REs. COUNCll.., RETHINKING Tiffi OZONE PROBLEM IN URBAN AND REGIONAL
AIR POLLUTION 351 {1991).
47
For example, soil composition and hydrology will effect the likelihood of groundwater contamination from runoff or waste disposal; population density and topography will effect the likely
public health impact of industrial accidents; weather patterns, such as the frequency of inversions, will
effect ambient concentrations of air pollutants, and so on.
46
At the extreme, concerns about federal environmental policy have provoked a strong,
potentially violent, backlash. One example of the backlash is the so-called "county supremacy"
movement, which seeks to assert local control over land-use, particularly in areas dependent upon
federal lands, which are necessarily subject to federal regulations. See Stephen Halbrook, Fear and
Loathing Out West, ENVTL. F., Sept.-Oct. 1995, at 1. For a critique of the county supremacy
movement, see Alexander H. Southwell, The County Supremacy Movement: The Federalism Implications of a 1990s States' Rights Battle, 32 GoNZAGA L. REv, 2 (1996/1997).
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intermediaries when polities are ill-conceived or overly burdensome.49 By
obscuring the lines of accountability, cooperative federalism undermines
accountability.
Although cooperative federalism has had its problems, some of which
this Comment will discuss, it is generally preferred over the alternatives:
direct federal regulation to preempt state efforts or encouragement through
fmancial incentives. 50 Moreover, unlike federal efforts to directly conscript state officials to assist in federal programs, cooperative federalism
has the explicit endorsement of the Supreme Court.51
2.

The Limits of Cooperation

Despite the formal effort to create and maintain a state-federal
partnership on environmental issues, there is substantial state and local
resistance to federal environmental programs. Observers note that "federal
environmental standards have been a chronic source of friction for federalstate relations. "52 This is due, in part, to the proliferation of "unfunded
mandates"-federal requirements upon state and local governments to
administer or comply with federal regulatory programs, unaccompanied by
sufficient funds to cover the mandates' cost. "Few contemporary issues
concern state and local policymakers as intensely as unfunded mandates."53
According to Governing magazine, by 1994 "at least 400 separate
subsections of the Code of Federal Regulations involving environmental
matters apply to local govenunents; another 400 require iocal governments
to enforce federal environmental requirements."54 The total annual cost of
such rules for state and local governments was expected to hit $50 billion
by the end of the decade. 55 But the effects of unfunded mandates run
deeper than their impact on city budgets. As one local health official

49
Fonner Natural Resources Defense Council attorney David Schoenbrod noted that ''federal
mandates give federal legislators and the president the means to take credit for the benefits of
environmental programs while placing the blame for any ensuing costs on state and local officials."
David Schoenbrod, Why States, Not EPA, Should Set Pollution Standards, in ENviRONMENTAL
FEDERALISM 264 (Terry Anderson & Peter J. Hill eds., 1997).
50
Examples of the fanner are the Toxic Substances Control Act and federal automobile emission
standards. Examples of the latter are the land-use planning provisions of the Coastal Zone Management
Act and subtitle D of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
51
See Hodel, 452 U.S. at 289.
52
Percival, supra note 13, at ll44.
" Edward A. Zelinsky, Unfunded Mandates, Hidden Taxation, and the Tenth Amendment: On
Public Choice, Public Interest, and Public Services, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1355, 1356 (1993).
54
Tom Arrandale, A Guide to Environmental Mandates, GoVERNING, Mar. 1994, at 36. As a
result, Arrandale reports, "state and local officials find themselves scouring the Federal Register and
conferring with EPA to keep abreast of evolving requirements." /d.

" See id.
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commented, "[w]hat bothers me is that the new rules coming out of Washington are taking money from decent programs and making me waste them
on less important problems. It kills you as a city official to see this kind of
money spent for nothing."56
In the early 1990s, state and local concerns about the proliferation of
unfunded mandates came to the fore. 57 Whereas there were 150 federal
mandates in 1960, there were 498 in 1979.58 Federal aid to state and local
governments increased substantially over this period as well, from $7
billion to $83 billion.59 The growth in mandates spurred a ground swell
of opposition from state and local governments. 60 After the congressional
elections of 1994, unfunded mandates rose to the top of Congress' legislative agenda,61 and mandate relief was one of the first elements of the
"Contract with America" enacted into law and signed by President
Clinton.62 However, this law, the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of
1995, was more symbolic than substantive. The law does nothing to limit
or reduce preexisting unfunded mandates. Instead it merely established new
reporting and procedural requirements for enactments that would produce
substantial new unfunded mandates.63 This may limit the proliferation of
unfunded mandates in the future, but will not reduce those already in
place.

56

Keith Schneider, How a Rebellion Over Environmental Rules Grew from a Patch of Weed!-,
N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 24, 1993, at Al5 (quoting Michael J. Pompilli, head of the envirorunental health
division, Columbus, Ohio, Health Department).
57
See THOMAS J. DILORENZO, UNFUNDED FEDERAL MANDATES: ENviRONMENTAliSM'S ACHILLES
HEEL? (1993); Susan E. Leckrone, Note, Turning Back the Clock: The Urifunded Mandates Reform Act
of 1995 and Its Effective Repeal of Environmental Legislation, 71 IND. LJ. I 029 ( 1996).
58
See Robert H. Freilich & David G. Richardson, Returning to a General Theory of Federalism:
Framing aNew Tenth Amendment United States Supreme Court Case, 26 URB. LAw. 215,222 (1994).
~~~
60

-

Victor H. Ashe, Mayor of Knoxville, Tennessee, wrote that "[g]one are the days when mayors,
city council members, county executives and county commissioners would simply shrug and say,
'Well, Congress says we have to."' Victor H. Ashe, A View from the Commission, INTERGOVERNMENTAL PERsP., Fall 1992, at 2.
61
An indication of how seriously Congress took this issue is the fact that the Unfunded Mandates
Reform Act of 1995 (UMRA) was introduced in the Senate as S.I.
62
Pub. L. No. 104-4, 109 Stat 48 (1995) (to be codified at 2 U.S.C. §§ 658-658d, 1501-1504).
It is also worth noting that President Clinton independently sought to quell the rebellion over unfunded
federal mandates by issuing an executive order on "Enhancing the Intergoverrunental Partnership"
barring federal agencies from issuing unnecessary unfunded mandates. Exec. Order No. 12,875, 58 Fed.
Reg. 58093 (1993).
63
"By itself, the UMRA will not accomplish real change over the long run because its major
enforcement mechanism-a point of order on the floor against any legislation that proposes an
unfunded mandate-is waivable by a simple majority vote." Rena I. Steinzor, Unfunded Environmental
Mandates and the "New (New) Federalism": Devolution, Revolution, or Reform?, 81 MINN. L. REv.
97, 99 (1996). For a critical overview of UMRA, see Angela Antonelli, Promises Unfulfilled: Unfunded
Mandates Reform Act of 1995, REG., 1996 No.2, at 44. See also U.S. GEN. ACCOUNfiNG OFFICE,
GAO/GGD-9830, UNFUNDED MANDATES: REFoRM Acr HAs HAD LITfLE EFFEcT ON AGENClFS'
RULEMAKING ACI10NS (1998).

582

GEO. MASON L. REV.

[Vol. 6:3

State and local officials complain that the federal government is too
rigid and means-oriented in its application of environmental law, hampering the ability of the states to enact sensible environmental policies. The
Environmental Protection Agency, in particular, "has increasingly overstepped its bounds and usurped the lawmaking responsibilities of Congress
and stepped on the state's ability to implement environmental reform,"
complained Michigan Governor John Engler.64 His is not an isolated
view. According to one commentator who surveyed state environmental
officials, "states resent what they believe to be an overly prescriptive
federal orientation toward state programs, especially in light of stable or
decreasing grant awards.'l65 Thus, states want more autonomy to implement environmental programs without being forced to kow-tow to the EPA
and its assessment of local environmental needs.
Finally, independent polling suggests that the American public has
become increasingly sympathetic to the idea of devolving authority over
environmental programs to the state and local level. In 1996, national
polling of registered voters found that "most Americans support a greater
role for state and local governments in environmental policy, and a reduced role for Washington."66 Democratic pollster Stanley Greenberg also
found that "[t]or ordinary citizens, devolution is a way of making the
environmental regime more responsive, more flexible and sensible.'l67
B.

The Supreme Court's Federalism Jurisprudence

Given the growth in political pressure for a greater sharing of power
over regulatory matters, particularly in the environmental context, court
decisions which expand the autonomy of state and local governments will
encourage the decentralization of authority over environmental programs.
Until quite recently, however, it seemed unlikely that the Supreme Court
would move in that direction.
1.

Background

In 1976, the Court sought to outline a test to protect states from

.. Governor John Engler, Speech Before Warren T. Brookes Fellowship Memorial Dinner (last
modified Nov. 19, 1996) <http://www.cei.org/pubs/1996/Brooks-eng1er.html>.
65
SCHEBERLE, supra note 40, at 186.
06
Jonathan H. Adler & Kellyanne Fitzpatrick, For the Environment, Against Overregulation,
WALL ST. I., July 29, 1996, at A12. This article summarizes the results of 1HE POlLING Co., A
NATIONAL SURVEY OF ATIITUDES ON ENVIRONMENTAL POUCY (CEI 1996).
67

(1995).

STANLEY B. GREENBERG, AGAINST TilE TIDE: IN DEFENSE OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUAUTY 4

1998]

THE GREEN AsPECTS OF PRIN1Z

583

undue congressional interference. In National League of Cities v. Usery, 68
a closely divided Court held that "Congressional enactments which may be
fully within the grant of legislative authority contained in the Commerce
Clause may nonetheless be invalid" if they infringe upon state sovereignty.69 In National League of Cities, the Court relied upon the Tenth
Amendment to invalidate Congress' attempt to apply the minimum wage
and overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standard Act (FLSA) to state
and local. governments.70 "We have repeated1y recognized that there are
attributes of sovereignty attaching to every state government which may
not be impaired by Congress," the Court held. 71 In particular, the majority
argued that "insofar as the challenged amendments operate to directly
displace the States' freedom to structure integral operations in areas of
traditional governmental functions, they are not within the authority
granted Congress by Art. I, § 8, cl. 3."72 In dissent, Justice Brennan noted
that Court precedent did not support the proposition that otherwise valid
federal regulations are voiqed merely because a state is involved. 73
Despite the language of National League of Cities, state efforts to
challenge federal laws did not fare well in the 1980s. In 1981, the Virginia
Surface Mining and Reclamation Association unsuccessfully challenged the
Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act, 74 inter alia, on Tenth
Amendment grounds. In Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining Association, the
Court held that the law in question did not regulate the "[s]tates as states,"
rather it regulated the activities of private mine operators.75 It merely gave
the states the option of either accepting preemptive federal regulations, or
regulating in accordance with federal guidelines. "If a State does not wish
to submit a proposed permanent program that complies with the Act and
implementing regulations, the full regulatory burden will be borne by the
Federal Government. " 76 This form of "cooperative federalism" the Court
ruled, was constitutional; 77 "[t]he denomination of an activity as a 'local'
or 'intrastate' activity does not resolve the question whether Congress may

.. 426 u.s. 833 (1976).
69
/d. at 841.
70
The FLSA had applied to private employers since 1938. See id. at 836. In 1961 Congress
extended the FLSA to cover employees of government "enterprises" that were engaged in commerce,
and the FLSA was applied to state hospitals and schools in 1966. See id. at 837. Each of these moves
was upheld in Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968). National League of Cities challenged Congress'
attempt to extend the FLSA to all state employees in 1974.
71
/d. at 845.
72
/d. at 852.
73
See id. at 861 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
" 30 u.s.c. §§ 1201-1328 (1994).
75
452 u.s. 264, 287 (1981).
76
/d. at 288.
72
/d. at 289.
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regulate it under the Commerce Clause.'m
The Court considered similar issues in Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC) v. Mississippi/9 a 1982 challenge to the constitutionality of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA) of 1978.80 In
FERC v. Mississippi, the Court reaffirmed that federal action is not necessarily invalid if it serves to "curtail or prohibit the States' prerogatives to
make legislative choices respecting subjects the States may consider
important.''81 In the case of PURPA, since Congress had the Commerce
Clause power to pre-empt any state regulation of electric utilities, it could
adopt a "less intrusive scheme and [allow] States to continue regulating in
the area on the condition that they consider the suggested federal standards.''82 In such instances, the Cou1i: ruled, states always retained the
ability to opt out of the regulatory endeavor, so there was nothing in the
Act '"directly compelling' the States to enact a legislative program. "83
· It was only a matter of time before the Supreme Court officially
disavowed the ostensible limits upon federal power contained in National
League of Cities, for as a practical matter, the National League of Cities
test was unworkable. 84 Indeed, "between National League of Cities and
Garcia, t.he Court failed to fmd any federal statute unconstitutional under
the National League of Cities test, a telling sign that National League of
Cities was not in any way, shape, or form protecting state sovereignty.''85
Not even the pretense of federalism upheld by National League of Cities
would last long.
In 1985 the Court explicitly overturned National League of Cities L11
Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority. 86 In Garcia, the
Court considered a virtually identical case: whether a local government
entity, in this case a metropolita11 transit authority, was exempt from the
minimum wage and overtime provisions of the FLSA. Justice Blackmun,
who had concurred in National League of Cities, concluded that the
"traditional government functions" test was "unworkable" and should be

18

Id. at 281.
456 u.s. 742 (1982).
80
Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat 3ll7 (1978) (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2643 (1994)).
81
FERC, 456 U.S. at 759 (citing Hodel, 452 U.S. at 290).
81
/d. at 765.
83 /d.
84
'The Court was led into a path of certain defeat by following an exclusive sphere of authority
approach to the relationship of federalism between the federal government and state and local
governments." Freilich & Richardson, supra note 58, at 217 .
., /d. at 218. Note, however, that "[s]ince its decision in 1976, National League of Cities has been
cited or quoted in opinions joined by every Member of the present Court" Garcia v. San Antonio
Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 558 (1985) {Powell, J., dissenting).
06
See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 557.
79
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overruled. 87 Indeed, the Court disavowed judicial efforts to determine
whether particular exercises of the Commerce Clause power ever intrude
onto state sovereignty:
State sovereign interests . . . are more properly protected by procedural safeguards inherent in the structure of the federal system than by judicially created
limitations on federal power .... [T]he principal and basic limit on the federal
commerce power is that inherent in all congressional action--the built-in
restraints that our system provides through state participation in federal
governmental action. 88

In other words, if state sovereignty needs to be protected, then Congress
will protect it, and the courts will not. Justice Powell, in dissent, warned
that the Court's "decision effectively reduces the Tenth Amendment to
meaningless rhetoric when Congress acts pursuant to the Commerce
Clause."89
The Court reaffmned the Garcia approach to federalism three years
later in South Carolina v. Baker.90 In Baker the Court held that "[s]tates
must fmd their protection from congressional regulation through the
national political process, not through judicially defmed spheres of
unregulable state activity."91 According to some commentators, the Garcia
opinion "appeared to have signaled the end of judicial federalism and the
demise of the Tenth Amendment as a constitutional limit on Congress'
Commerce Clause powers."92 Justice Rehnquist was not so sure. In dissent,
he predicted that federalism would "in time again command the support of
a majority of this Court."93

81

/d. at 546.
/d. at 552, 556. The Court endorsed Justice Brennan's argument in dissent in National League
of Cities that states should simply look after themselves in the political process as "[d]ecisions upon
the extent of federal intervention under the Commerce Clause into the affairs of the States are ... decisions of the States themselves." National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 876 (1976). It is
doubtful that Justice Brennan would adopt a similar approach to the other constitutional guarantees
contained in the Bill of Rights merely because the decisions of Congress to intervene into the affairs
of the people are, through their representatives, the decisions of the people themselves. Moreover, once
the Constitution was amended to provide for the direct election of senators, U.S. CONST. amend. XVll,
it was no longer plausible to argue that the interests of states qua states were represented in the U.S.
Senate.
" Garcia, 469 U.S. at 560 (Powell, J., dissenting).
"' 485
505 (1988).
•• /d. at 512.
92
Freilich & Richardson, supra note 92, at 215.
93
Garcia, 469 U.S. at 580 (ReliDquist, J., dissenting).
88

u.s.
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Reinvigoration

Justice Rehnquist was right; reports of the Tenth Amendment's demise
were exaggerated. In the 1990s, the Supreme Court reversed course and
began to reassert the importance of state sovereignty in the federal system.
The Printz decision is only the most recent of several cases that have
reaffirmed the principles of federalism and restricted the power of the
federal government over state and local matters, the most important of
which are New York v. United States94 and United States v. Lopez.95
These three decisions are evidence that the Court is once again taking
seriously the concept of "dual sovereignty," and will not leave the protection of state autonomy to the vagaries of the legislative process.
a.

New York v. United States

In 1992, the Supreme Court voided portions of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985.% Congress enacted the
Waste Policy Amendments to ensure that every state developed adequate
disposal for low-level radioactive waste, such as that generated by hospitals,
research labs, and nuclear power plants. It did this by: (a) providing
monetary incentives in the form of subsidies and surcharges on waste
disposal; (b) authorizing states to block the import of waste from other
states; and (c) requiring states with inadequate disposal capacit<; to take title
to, and assume liability for, low-level radioactive waste generated within the
state. The Court invalidated the last of these policies due to its coercive
nature, holding that "while Congress has substantial power under the
Constitution to encourage the States to provide for the disposal of the
radioactive waste generated within their borders, the Constitution does not
confer upon Congress the ability simply to compel the States to do so."97
Despite the Court's prior holdings in Garcia and Baker, the majority held
that "the Constitution has never been understood to confer upon Congress
the ability to require the States to govern according to Congress' in-

505 u.s. 144 (1992).
514 U.S. 549 (1995). Other recent Supreme Court cases reinforcing federalism include: City of
Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct 2157 (1997) (holding that the Supreme Court, not the Congress,
determines the scope of Congress' enforcement power under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment); Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (holding Congress lacks the authority
to abrogate states Eleventh Amendment immunity from liability); Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505
U.S. 504 (1992) (holding that historic State police powers will not be superseded by federal law
without explicit evidence of Congressional intent to do so); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 542 (1991)
(upholding state constitution's mandatory retirement age for judges).
96
Pub. L. No. 99-240 (1985) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2021-202lb (1994)).
97
New York, 505 U.S. at 149 (emphasis added).
94

9

'
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structions."98 To hold otherwise would be to reject the idea that the states
themselves retain substantial sovereignty within the federal system.
The Court's holding laid out simple ground rules for federal efforts to
enlist state assistance in regulatory programs: "The Constitution enables the
Federal Governme~t to pre-empt state regulation contrary to federal interests, and it permits the Federal Government to hold out incentives to the
States as a means of encouraging them to adopt suggested regulatory
schemes. It does not, however, authorize Congress simply to direct the
States" to adopt Congress' policy prescriptions.99 "Whatever the outer
limits of [state] sovereignty may be, one thing is clear: The Federal Government may not compel the States to enact or administer a federal regulatory
program." 100
New York did not eviscerate Congress' ability to regulate interstate
commerce or rely upon the states to fulfill national policy goals, it merely
proscribed the methods Congress may use. If Congress is unwilling to
instruct the federal executive to regulate directly, it still may seek to
encourage state participation in a federal scheme. 101 The most obvious
means of accomplishing this is to offer funds to the states with conditions
attached, or to threaten to cut off an existing funding stream if set conditions are not met. 102 Such encouragement has significant force, but it also
has limits. The Court held that "[s]uch conditions must ... bear some
relationship to the purpose of the federal spending; otherwise, of course, the
spending power could render academic the Constitution's. other grants and
limits of federal authority." 103 Under New York, Congress may also give
states the choice of either implementing a program that complies with
federal guidelines or accepting federal preemption of the state program by
a federally administered one. This latter approach is "cooperative federalism."104
Thus, while New York did not impose substantive restraints upon
Congress' power, it did place structural impediments to the enactment of
laws that would excessively intrude into states' sovereign realms, and
thereby threaten individual liberty. The Court made explicit that "[t]he

98
/d. at 162. Justice O'Connor found support for her opinion in lhe language of Hodel concluding
that Congress cannot "commandeer lhe legislative processes of lhe Stales by directly compelling lhem
to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program." /d. at 161 (citing Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining
& Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981)).
99
ld. at 188.

/d.
The Court noled lhat lhere are "a variety of melhods, short of outtight coercion, by which
Congress may urge a Stale to adopt a legislative program consislent wilh federal inlerests." /d. at 167.
"" "[U]nder Congress' spending power 'Congress may attach conditions on lhe receipt of federal
funds."' /d. (citing Soulh Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203,206 (1987)).
103
/d. at 167 (citations omitted).
104
/d.; see also supra Part I.A.l.
1110

101
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Constitution does not protect the sovereignty of States for the benefit of the
States or state governments as abstract political entities . . . . To the
contrary, the Constitution divides authority between federal and state
governments for the protection of individuals." 105
b.

United States v. Lopez

Constitutional inquiries as to whether given sovereign powers were
granted to the federal government under the Constitution or retained by the
States are "mirror images" of the same question. 106 "If a power is delegated to Congress in the Constitution, the Tenth Amendment expressly
disclaims any reservation of that power to the States; if a power is an
attribute of state sovereignty reserved by the Tenth Amendment, it is
necessarily a power the Constitution has not conferred on Congress." 107
Thus, Supreme Court holdings on the extent of Congress' Commerce
Clause. power are central to any federalism inquiry, particularly in those few
cases in which they serve to limit Congress' authority.
In 1995, the Supreme Court explicitly limited Congress' Commerce
Clause power for the first time in over fifty years. In United States v.
Lopez, the Court held that the Gun-Free Schools Act of 1990 "neither
regulates a commercial activity nor contains a requirement that the possession be connected in any way to interstate commerce," and therefore
exceeded Congress' power "to regulate Commerce." 108 The Court based its
decision on a three-part test to determine whether regulating a given activity
falls within Congress' power to regulate commerce. Under this test, Congress may regulate the "channels of interstate cmmnerce" a.>Jd their use, the
instrumentalities of interstate commerce, and those activities that
"substantially affect" interstate commerce. 109 Possession of a gun in a
school zone failed to meet this test, even if that gun had traveled in
interstate commerce.
Insofar as the Court fmds limitations on the authority to regulate
matters of state or local concern, it reinforces the "dual sovereignty" of the
federal system. 110 This point was made explicit in Justice Kennedy's
concurrence: "Were the Federal Government to take over the regulation of
entire areas of traditional state concern, areas having nothing to do with the
regulation of commercial activities, the boundaries between the spheres of

IDS
106

107
108

fd. at 18J.
ld. at 156.
ld.

United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995).
ld. at 558-59.
110
A federal statute that intrudes into state and local matters ''forecloses the States from
experimenting and exercising their own judgment" ld. at 583 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
109
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federal and state authority would blur and political responsibility would
become illusory." 111 The majority also recalled that in NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel-at the height of the Court's expansive Commerce Clause
interpretation-the Court had declared that the clause should be interpreted
"in the light of our dual system of government." 112 To hold otherwise
"would effectively obliterate the distinction between what is national and
what is local and create a completely centralized government." 113 A plenary Commerce Clause power would completely eviscerate the governmental
design that the founders sought to create. Thus, the Court recognized that
Congress' Commerce Clause power could not operate without constraint if
federalism is to be a meaningful safeguard of liberty.
ll.

PRINIZ V. UNITED STATES

Taken together, New York and Lopez made clear that state sovereignty
is more than an abstract notion-it is a substantive constraint upon federal
power that a majority on the Supreme Court will enforce. Congress can
neither regulate that which is beyond its power nor coerce states into
enacting regulatory programs that Congress would prefer not to enact
itself. 114 However, neither case explicitly addressed the question of whether Congress could commandeer state officials. If so, Congress could evade
the limitations imposed by Lopez and New York and federalism's revival
would end before it had scarcely begun. Printz directly addressed this issue.
Facts

A.

In 1993, Congress amended the Gun Control Act of 1968 115 to im.:

pose a background check and temporary waiting period on buyers of
handguns. 116 This measure, called the Brady Act, 117 imposes a five-day

"' ld. at 577 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937).
113
Jd. at 37. Justice O'Connor made a similar point dissenting in Garcia: "If stale autonomy is
ignored in assessing the means by which Congress regulates matters affecting commerce, then
federalism becomes irrelevant simply because the set of activities remaining beyond the reach of such
a commerce power 'may well be negligible."' Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S.
528, 588 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
114
See supra Part I.B.2.
"' Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213 (1968) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-925
(1994)).
116
See 18 U.S.C. § 922(s).
117
Proponents of a waiting period for handgun purchases named the Act after former White House
press secretary James Brady, who was shot and seriously injured when John Hinckley attempted to
assassinate President Ronald Reagan in 1981. Proponents argued that had there been a waiting period
and/or background check in place, Hinckley would have been unable to purchase the gun with which
112
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waiting period on the purchase of handguns. 118 During this period, the
local chief law enforcement officer (CLEO) must "make a reasonable
effort" to conduct a background check of relevant state, local and national
records to determine whether the handgun purchase "would be in violation
of the law, including research in whatever state and local record-keeping
systems are available and in a national system designated by the Attorney
General." 119 If the purchaser may buy the gun, the CLEO must destroy the
information gathered for the background check within twenty days! 20 If
the purchaser may not buy the gun, then the CLEO must provide a written
explanation to the prospective handgun purchaser. 121 The law also enables
individuals wrongfully barred from purchasing a handgun to sue "the State
or political subdivision responsible . . . for denying the transfer" 122 and
provides criminal sanctions for violating the Brady Act's provisions. 123
Although the federal government claimed that the Brady Act merely
required local officials "to give modest assistance in the implementation of
the federal regulation of gun transfers" for a temporary period of time, 124
the district court, as the fmder of fact, concluded that the CLEOs' obliga-

he shot Reagan and Brady. For example, upon first introducing the Brady bill in the Senate, Senator
Howard Metzenbaum quoted James Brady's wife, Sarah Brady, who argued that "[h]ad a waiting
period and background check for purchasers been in effect, John Hinckley could have been stopped."
133 CONG. REc. SI792 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1987) (statement of Sen. Metzenbaum).
18
'
Under the terms of the Act, the waiting period would expire in 1999 at which time an instant
computer background check would be required for all gun sales. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(t)(l)(A). A
waiting period is not required in states where an instant computer background check is already
operational.
119
ld. § 922(s)(2). Under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), a person is prohibited from purchasing or possessing
a firearm:
(I) who has been convicted in any court of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term
exceeding one year; (2) who is a fugitive from justice; (3) who is an unlawful user of or
addicted to any controlled substance ... ; (4) who has !J<>..en adjudicated as a mental defective
or who has been committed to a mental institution; (5) who, being an alien, is illegally or
unlawfully in the United States; (6) who has been discharged from the Armed Forces under
dishonorable conditions; (7) who, having been a citizen of the United States, has renounced
his citizenship; or (8) who is subject to a [restraining order in a domestic dispute] ....
120
See id. § 922(s)(6)(B)(i).
121
See id. § 922(s)(6)(C).
122
ld. § 925. Despite its explicit language, this provision would only affect political subdivisions,
such as municipalities, as the Supreme Court has held that Congress lacks the power to abrogate States'
immunity from suit under the Eleventh Amendment, See Seminole Tribe of Aorida v. Aorida, 116 S.
CL 1114 (1996). Also note that under § 922(s)(7), CLEOs are not liable for failing to prevent the
unlawful purchase of a handgun or the wrongful prevention of a handgun sale.
123
See 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(5). "[A]lthough the Brady Act establishes criminal penalties for
knowing violations of the Act . . . the Department of Justice has concluded that those criminal
sanctions do not apply to CLEOs who fail to abide by section 922(s)(2)." Brief for the United States
at 6, Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct 2365 (1997) (Nos. 95-1478 and 95-1503). Despite the Justice
Department's conclusion, the Federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms officials maintained
that "the criminal penalties certainly could be applied to CLEOs" who fail to perform background
checks. Petitioner's Brief at II, Printz (No. 95-1478).
124
Brief for the United States at 10, Printz (Nos. 95-1478 and 95-1503).
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tions under the Brady Act were "far from de minimis." 125 According to the
court, "[t]he ascertainment/background check is most burdensome." 126 For
a CLEO to check for an of the possible disqualifications for a gun purchase, he would have to examine numerous databases, some by hand. 127
Due to the burdens imposed by the Brady Act, Jay Printz, sheriff and
coroner for Ravalli County, Montana, filed a suit alleging that the law
violated the Tenth Amendment by commandeering local officials to
implement a federal regulatory program. A similar challenge to the Brady
Act was filed in an Arizona federal district court by Graham County Sheriff
Richard Mack. 128
Both district courts held section 922(s) of the Brady Act to be unconstitutional under the Tenth Amendment, enjoined the enforcement of that
section, and upheld the remainder of the Act. 129 On appeal, the two cases
were heard together by the Ninth Circuit, which upheld the mandatory
background check in a 2-1 opinion. 130

Summary ofPrintz Opinion

B.

The Supreme Court held that the mandatory background check
provisions of the Brady Act were unconstitutional infringements upon state
sovereignty. 131 Justice Scalia wrote the majority opinion, and was joined
by Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, Thomas, and Chief Justice Rehnquist. 132
Justices Stevens, Breyer, Ginsburg, and Souter dissented. The lineup and
opi.Jions echoed iJiOse in New York v. United States; 133 only justice Souter
switched sides. In a separate dissenting opinion, he explicitly argued, that

125
126

Printz v. United States, 854 F. Supp. 1503, 1517 (D. Mont 1994).

/d.

127
Sheriff Printz provided undisputed evidence at trial that to fulfill the Brady Act a CLEO would
have to search the National Crime Information Center database, the Criminal Justice Information
Network, state hospital records, county court civil records, veteran's hospital records, misdemeanor
court records and medical and drug treatment records. Not all of these records can be searched by computer, and some are stored several hours drive from Ravalli County where Sheriff Printz works. Thus,
Printz maintained, "[a] background check might require anywhere between an hour and several days."
Petitioner's Brief at 4, Printz (No. 95-1478).
128
See Mack v. United States, 856 F. Supp. 1372 (D. Ariz. 1994)_. Four other challenges were also
filed in federal court around the country, but these were not consolidated for review by the Supreme
Court See Romero v. United States, 883 F. Supp. 1076 (W.O. La. 1995); McGee v. United States, 863
F. Supp. 321 (S.D. Miss. 1994); Frank v. United States, 860 F. Supp. 1030 (D,.Vt 1994); Koog v.
United States, 852 F. Supp. 1376 (W.D. Tex. 1994).
129
See Mack v. United States, 856 F. Supp. 1372 (D. Ariz. 1994); Printz v. United States, 854 F.
Supp 1503 (D. Mont 1994).
130
See Mack v. United States, 66 F.3d 1025 (9th Cir. 1995).
131
See Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct 2365 (1997).
132
Justices O'Counor and Thomas joined the majority opinion but also wrote separate concurrences. See id. at 2385.
I3J 505 u.s. 144 (1992).
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the result in New York was consistent with upholding the Brady Act background check. 134
1.

Majority Opinion

The issue in Printz was an extension of that in New York. In New
York, the Court invalidated the provisions of the Low-Level Radioactive
Waste Policy Amendments through which Congress sought to compel the
states to implement a federal program through legislative action. With the
Brady Act, Congress bypassed the state legislature and sought "to direct
state law enforcement officers to participate, albeit only temporarily, in the
administration of a federally enacted regulatory scheme." 135 The Brady
Act used a less direct means of achieving its end than had the Waste Policy
Amendments. However, as a practical matter, fmding for the federal
government in either case would give Congress the ability to conscript state
governments for federal causes.
Rather than rest the holding squarely on the shoulders of the New York
opinion-note that prudentially the cases presented the same fundamental
issue-the Printz majority sought to expand the rationale for limiting the
federal government's ability to command state governments for federal
purposes. "The Federal Government may neither issue directives requiring
the States to address particular problems, nor command the States' officers,
or those of their political subdivisions, to administer or enforce a federal
regulatory program," the Court held, 136 concluding that "such commands
are fundamentally h1compatible wiih our constitutional system of dual
sovereignty. " 137
Justice Scalia's opinion for the majority was not based upon a close
reading of constitutional text; "there is no constitutional text speaking to
this precise question." 138 Rather, the majority rested its decision on a
tripartite analysis of (1) historical understanding of the Constitution; (2) the
Constitution's structure; and (3) prior Supreme Court jurisprudence. 139

134
See Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2401 (Souter, J ., dissenting). Justice Breyer also authored a dissent
that Stevens joined. See id. at 2404 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
m !d. at 2369.
136
!d. at 2384.

/d.
!d. at 2370.
9
"
"Because there is no constitutional text speaking to this precise question, the answer to the
CLEO's challenge must be sought in historical understanding and practice, in the structure of the
Constitution, and in the jurisprudence of this Court." Id.
137

138
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Historica1 Understanding

The majority's first argument is the least compelling. The historica1
record on the question presented to the Court in the Brady Act is ambiguous, and there is a strong argument that the Founders were unafraid of
a1lowing Congress to conscript state and loca1 magistrates. 140 To identify
the historica1 understanding of the federa1-state relationship, Justice Scalia
examined sources contemporaneous with the writing of the Constitution,
giving particular weight to the character of the enactments of the early
Congresses. 141 Justice Sca1ia noted that there were no statutes in the early
Congresses explicitly ca11ing upon state executives to implement federa1
programs. However, there are statutes in which Congress requested states'
voluntary acquiescence to federal goa1s. For example, Justice Scalia pointed
out that on September 23, 1789-one day before the enactment of the Tenth
Amendment-the very first Congress enacted a law providing for federa1
prisoners to be held in state jails at federa1 expense. 142 This law did not
command states to acquiesce to federa1 instruction. Instead, it merely
recommended that the legislatures instruct jailkeepers to keep federa1
prisoners and offered to compensate states for their actions. Not a11 states
complied with Congress' request. Georgia, for one, refused. But rather than
compel Georgia to comply with the federa1 program, Congress instead
authorized federa1 marsha1s to rent jail space until the federa1 government
constructed or otherwise acquired permanent jails. 143
The Court concluded that "there is not only an absence of executivecomtuandeef..ng statutes in the early Congresses, but LlJere is an absence of
them in our later history as well." 144 The only exception to this genera]
proposition was a handful of recent statutes identified by the dissent. 145 ·

140

See infra note 172, 214.
Although the actions of early Congresses are not dispositive, "such 'contemporaneous
legislative exposition of the Constitution . . . , acquiesced in for a long term of years, fixes the
construction to be given its provisions."' Printz, 117 S. Ct at 2370 (citing Myers v. United States, 272
u.s. 52, 175 (1926)).
142
See id. at 2372 (citing Act of Sept 23, 1789, 1 Stat 96).
143
See id. The dissent argues correctly that the mere fact that Congress never exercised a duty is
no reason to presume that the duty does not exist However, long-standing historical practice should
inform congressional interpretation. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579
(1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). "Deeply embedded traditional ways of conducting government
cannot supplant the Constitution or legislation, but they give meaning to the words of a text or supply
them." /d. at 610.
144
Printz, 117 S. Ct at 2375.
145
See id. at 2394 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The statutes include 40 Stat 80-1 (registration of
young adults for the draft), 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001, 11003 (1994) (creation of response commissions for
release of hazardous substances), 42 U.S.C. § 6991a (data collection and reporting on underground
storage tanks), 23 U.S.C. § 402(a) (1994) (reporting traffic fatalities), and 42 U.S.C. § 5779(a)
(reporting missing children). The decision's impact on the two environmental programs on this list is
141
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Other courts have independently arrived at the same conclusion when faced
with a similar question. 146
Justice Scalia readily acknowledged that in the founding period
Congress instructed state courts to perform a variety of functions, such as
recording applications of citizenship and registering aliens. 147 However,
Justice Scalia argued that "[t]hese early laws establish, at most" that
Congress could impose obligations on state judges "related to matters
appropriate for the judicial power." 148 Justice Scalia explicitly rejected the
argument that "early statutes imposing obligations on state courts imply a
power of Congress to impress the state executive into its service," 149
noting that while there are many statutes imposing duties on the judiciary,
there is an "utter lack of statutes" imposing similar duties on state executives.150
The majority also questioned the federal government's (and the
dissent's) reliance on The Federalist Papers to support the claim that the
Framers intended to allow the federal government to coerce state and local
officials to fulfill federal policies. 151 To the majority, discussions by Alexander Hamilton or others about the use of state officials as tax collectors or
other federal servants "appear to rest on the natural assumption that the
States would consent to allowing their officials to assist the Federal Government ... ," 152 recalling that the early Congresses did not conscript state
officials, and instead relied upon their cooperation or goodwill. 153 Hamilton may have called for the use of state and government officials in seeking

discussed infra Part ill.B.
46
'
See Brown v. EPA, 521 F.2d 827, 841 (9th Cir. 1975) ("Federal law often says to the states,
'Don't do any of these things,' leaving outside the scope of its prohibition a wide range of alternative
courses of action. But it is illuminating to observe how rai-ely it says, 'Do This thing,' leaving no
choice but to go ahead and do it").
147
See Printz, l17 S. Ct at 2370. Justice Scalia also cited evidence suggesting that this requirement may have "applied only in States that authorized their courts to conduct naturalization proceedings." /d.
148
!d. at 2371.
149 ld.
ISO Jd.
151
For example, Alexander Hamilton wrote in THE FEDERALIST that the federal government "must
stand in need of no intermediate legislations, but must itself be empowered to employ the arm of the
ordinary magistrate to execute its own resolutions." THE FEDERALIST No. 16, at 154 (Alexander
Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987). Also, in THE FEDERALIST No. 27, Hamilton wrote that the
Constitution would "enable the [federal] government to employ the ordinary magistracy of each [state]
in the execution of its laws." THE FEDERALIST No. 27, at 203 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick
ed., 1987). However, Hamilton also noted that there were those who feared this would "tend to the
destruction of the State governments." /d. at 204 n.37.
152
Printz, 117 S. Ct at 2372.
153
See id. at 2373. The majority also points out that the language in THE FEDERALIST No. 27
relied upon by Justice Souter in his dissent would seem to include state legislatures, and not just
executives, thereby undermining Souter and the majority's support for the holding of New York. See
id. at 2373 & n.S.
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to ensure the Constitution's ratification by New York, but that did not mean
that the rest of the. Framers concurred. In sum, the historical evidence is
suggestive, but "not conclusive." 154
b.

Constitutional Structure

A more compelling justification for the Printz decision is that "the
Constitution established a system of 'dual sovereignty,"' 155 that "is reflected throughout the Constitution's text." 156 The federal government has
power over the states in particular realms, but states nonetheless maintain
a sphere of sovereignty that is "inviolable."157 This residual sovereignty is
"implicit" in the Constitution's delegation of "discrete, enumerated" powers
in Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution and the Tenth Amendment's
explicit charge that "the powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States,
respectively, or to the people." 158 As the Court held in New York, while
the language of the Amendment is tautological, "the Tenth Amendment
confmns that the power of the Federal Government is subject to limits that
may, in a given instance, reserve power to the States."159
Accepting the states as sovereign units within the federal system
compels the conclusion that there must be some limits upon the federal
government's power over state matters. 160 "The power of the Federal
Government would be augmented immeasurably if it were able to impress
into its service-and at no cost to itself-the police officers of the 50

154

/d. at 2376.
/d. (citing Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457 (1991)).
156
/d. Among the exa;nples identified by Justice Scalia are "the prohibition on a11y involuntary
reduction or combination of a State's territory" contained in Article IV, § 3, and the Amendment
process contained in Article V. /d.
157
THE FEoERAUST No. 39, at 258 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987). For Madison,
the country has "a federal and not a national constitution" in that "[e]ach State, in ratifying the
Constitution, is considered as a sovereign body." /d. at 257 (emphasis in original).
1
"' Printz, 117 S. Ct at 2376-77.
159
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 157 (1992). The opinion continues: ''The Tenth
Amendment thus directs us to determine, as in this case, whether an incident of state sovereignty is
protected by a limitation on an Article I power." /d.
160
Historically such limits may have been explicitly contained in Article I, § 8 of the Constitution.
However, the expansion of congressional powers under the Commerce Clause has undermined Article
I, § 8 as an independent limitation on federal intrusions upon state sovereignty, the Court's recent
Lopez decision notwithstanding:
The Federal Government undertakes activities today that would have been unimaginable to
the Framers in two senses; first, because the Framers would not have conceived that any
government would conduct such activities; and second, because the Framers would not have
believed that the Federal Government, rather than the States, would assume such responsibilities.
/d. at 157.
155
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states." 161 This would fundamentally disrupt the system of dual sovereignty that the Founders sought to create, and compromise the "double security"162 that it is intended to preserve. As the Court held previously, "[t]he
preservation of the States, and the maintenance of their governments, are as
much within the design and care of the Constitution as the preservation of
the Union and the maintenance of the National government." 163
Justice Scalia's majority opinion drew upon the historical discussion of
the Constitution's structure that was central to Justice O'Connor's opinion
in New York. 164 O'Connor pointed out that during the debate over the
Constitution, the Framers considered two models of federal power. Under
the first, proposed by the New Jersey delegation, the federal government
would have the power to command the states and act through them to
achieve national goals. It could not, however, act directly upon the people.
An alternative plan was put forward by Edmund Randolph that would
empower the federal government to authorize "national Legislation over
individuals." 165 Under O'Connor's reading, these two options-authorizing
legislative power over states or individuals-were two separate options, and
the Founders opted for the latter. 166 The alternative of "a sovereignty over
sovereigns" was, to James Madison, "a solecism in theory" and "in practice ... subversive of the order and ends of [a] civil polity." 167
Whereas the dissent argued that the power to commandeer state
officials for federal purposes is a "necessary and proper" exercise of the
Commerce Clause power under Article I, Section 8, the majority relied
upon New York's holding that "even where the Congress has the authority

161

Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2378.
THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 321 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987). "Just as the
separation and independence of the coordinate branches of the Federal Government serve to prevent the
accumulation of excessive power in any one branch, a healthy balance of power between the States and
the Federal Government will reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse from either front." Gregory, 501
U.S. at 458.
163
Texas v. While, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700 (1869).
164
See New York, 505 U.S. at 164-65.
165
1 REcORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 255-56 (Max Farrand ed., 1911).
166
"The Framers explicitly chose a Constitution that confers upon Congress the power to regulate
individuals, not States." New York, 505 U.S. at 166. O'Connor noles that in making the case for the
Virginia Plan, Randolph argued that "[t]here are but two modes, by which the end of a General
Governn~ent can be attained," suggesting a dichotomy of two discrete options. ld. at 164. Massachusetts delegate Rufus King also explained his support for a new Constitution by stating, "[l]aws, to be
effective, therefore, must not be laid on states, but upon individuals." ld. at 165 (citing 2 JONATHAN
ELuOT, DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 56 (2d ed. 1863) (emphasis added)). The dissent
argues that the two plans were not dichotomous and that the debate was instead over whether to give
the federal governnient additional power, as opposed to power of a different sort. "The basic change
in the character of the government that the Framers conceived was designed to enhance the power of
the national government, not to provide some new, unmentioned inununity for state officers." Printz,
117 S. Ct. at 2389 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
167
THE F'EDERAUST No. 20, at 172 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987).
162
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under the Constitution to pass laws requiring or prohibiting certain acts, it
lacks the power directly to compel the States to require or prohibit those
acts." 168 Thus, while the majority accepted Congress' ability to regulate
the sale and transfer of handguns, it rejected Congress' ability to require
that states impose the same regulations. 169
A fmal structural argument made by the majority is that the Brady Act
effectively transfers the Executive's power to execute the nation's laws to
municipal officers in the various states, and thereby undermines the "unity
in the Federal Executive.'mo The Constitution explicitly vests "the executive Power" in the President and states the President "shall take Care that
the Laws be faithfully executed." 171 Executing and enforcing federal law
is the obligation of the executive branch, not that of the states.
c.

Prior Court Holdings

The last and most conclusive element in the majority opinion is its
reliance on prior Supreme Court jurisprudence. However much the dissent
takes issue with the majority's historical interpretations or structural arguments-some of which are certainly open to debate 172-it is difficult to
argue against the outcome of Printz given the holdings of New York and
other recent federalism cases. 173 Upholding the background check provision of the Brady Act would effectively nullify the Court's ruling in New
168

New York, 505 U.S. at 166.
This claim is distinguished from the holdings in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining &
Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 287-88 (1981) and FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 759 (1982).
See supra notes 75-83 and accompanying text.
It should also be noted that while the majority opinion accepted Congress' power to regulate the
intrastate transfer of firearms, Justice Thomas, in his concurrence, expressed his self-described
"revisionist" view that Congress' powers under the Commerce Clause are far more circumscribed than
recent Court decisions would suggest. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2385 (Thomas, J., concurring):
Even if we construe Congress' authority to regulate interstate commerce to encompass those
intrastate transactions that "substantially affect" interstate commerce, I question whether
Congress can regulate the particular transactions at issue here. The Constitution, in addition
to delegating certain enumerated powers to Congress, places whole areas outside the reach
of Congress' regulatory authority.
Thomas goes on to raise the possibility that a "colorable argument exists" that the Brady Act also
infringes upon the Second Amendment to the Constitution. Id. at 2386.
170
Id. at 2378. Concern for the unitary executive is a common theme in Justice Scalia's opinions.
See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 697 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
171
u.s. CoNST. art. n, §§ 1, 3 (emphasis added).
m See, e.g., Evan H. Caminker, State Sovereignty and Subordinacy: May Congress Commandeer
State Officers to Implement Federal Law?, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1001 (1995); Saikrishna Bangalore
Prakash, Field Office Federalism, 79 VA. L. REV. 1957 (1993) (arguing that Congress may commandeer state judicial and executive officials, but not legislatures).
173
Indeed, only Justice Souter argued that the Court could uphold the Brady Act background
check without disturbing the holding in New York. See Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2402 (Souter, J., dissenting).
169
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York, reducing the constitutional protection of state sovereignty from
congressional overreach to an empty, formalistic doctrine.
Justice Scalia notes that the first cases directly addressing the question
as to whether the federal government could commandeer state officers arose
in the 1970s, when several states and the District of Columbia challenged
the Environmental Protection Agency's implementation of the Clean Air
Act. The EPA lost in three of four circuit courts. 174 One court remarked
that the idea that the federal government could command states to implement specific regulations was "clearly inconsistent with the history of our
federal structure." 175 The Supreme Court never ruled on this question
because the EPA withdrew the affected regulations after the Court had
granted certiorari, rendering the case moot. 176
When the Supreme Court fmally had the opportunity to address the
question of whether Congress could commandeer the states to implement
federal programs, it answered in the negative. "Where a federal interest is
sufficiently strong to cause Congress to legislate, it must do so directly; it
may not conscript state governments as its agents. "m Not only do such
actions compromise the federal structure inherent in the Constitution, they
also undermine accountability of government at both the state and local
level; "where the Federal Government directs the States to regulate, it may
be state officials who will bear the brunt of public disapproval, while the
federal officials who devised the regulatory program may remain insulated
from the electoral ramifications of their decision." 178 Whereas the New
York opinion overturned a congressional attempt to conscript state legislatures to enact specific programs, the Printz majority simply extended the
argument of New York to cover federal efforts to conscript state-level
executive power. 179 This was contemplated in the New York opinion: "The
Federal Government may not compel the States to enact or administer a
federal regulatory program." 180
The ruling in New York, although the first to address directly the

174
The EPA's regulations were invalidated on constitutional and statutory grounds by the D.C.
CircuiL See District of Columbia v. Train, 521 F.2d 971 (D.C. Cir. 1975). The Fourth and Ninth
Circuits raised doubts about the constitutionality of the EPA's regulations, but opted to invalidate them
on statutory grounds. Maryland v. EPA, 530 F.2d 215 (4th Cir. 1975); Brown v. EPA, 521 F.2d 827
(9th Cir. 1975). Similar regulations were upheld by the Third CircuiL Pennsylvania v. EPA, 500 F.2d
246 (3d Cir. 1974). See infra Part ill.C. Of course, unreviewed precedents of circuit courts would in
no way bind the Supreme Court to follow suiL
m Brown, 521 F.2d at 838.
17
'
See EPA v. Brown, 431 U.S. 99 (1977).
m New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 177 (1992).
'" ld. at 169.
179
Had the Court held otherwise, it would have effectively emasculated the power of the New
York holding as Congress would simply conscript state officials directly in every instance, and bypass
the legislature. See infra Part II.C.
180
New York, 505 U.S. at 188 (emphasis added).
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question of federal commandeering of state governments, had been foreshadowed in the Court's prior cases. For instance, in Hodel, the Court ruled
that the federal government may not "commandeer the legislative processes
of the States by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal
regulatory program." 181 Similarly, in FERC v. Mississippi the Court noted
that it "never has sanctioned explicitly a federal command to the States to
promulgate and enforce laws and regulations." 182 While both Hodel and
FERC v. Mississippi upheld the statutes in question, this was because
neither law directly compelled state regulatory action. 183 Thus, Justice
Scalia wrote, the opinion in New York "should have come as no surprise."Js4
Justice Scalia was also careful to distinguish the ruling in Garcia from
that in Printz. The challenge to the Brady Act did not call upon the Court
to determine "whether the incidental application to the States of a federal
law of general applicability excessively interfered with the functioning of
state governments" because "it is the whole object of the law to direct the
functioning of the state executive." 185 The primary distinction is between
a federal law that seeks to direct the actions of states qua states and that
which imposes upon states because it directs all entities-public and
private-to adhere to a federally determined standard, such as a minimum
wage. 186 Thus, Printz and Garcia implicate two different aspects of federalism, and the invalidation of a federal enactment in the former need not
interfere with the holding in the latter. 187
2.

The Dissents

Whereas the majority explicitly relied upon the Court's holding in New
York, the dissent penned by Justice Stevens ("dissent"), claimed that the
challenges to the Brady Act did not "implicate the more difficult
questions ... addressed in New York." 188 Rather, the dissent posited that
the case presented the more narrow question "whether Congress, acting on

181

Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981).
FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 761-62 (1982).
183
See Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2380.
184 ld.
185
ld. at 2383.
186
This distinction was noted in New York, 505 U.S. at 160.
187
Justice Stevens acknowledges the distinction, and its grounding in precedent, although he finds
it unpersuasive. See Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2397 (Stevens, -J., dissenting) ("[f)he Court does not disturb
the conclusion that flows directly from our prior holdings that the burden on police officers would be
permissible if a similar burden were also imposed on private parties with access to relevant data ....
•A. structural problem !:!>..at vanishes when the statute affects private individuals as well as public officials
is not much of a structural problem.'').
188
Id. at 2386 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
182
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behalf of the people . . . may require local law enforcement officers to
perform certain duties during the interim needed for the development of a
federal gun control program." 189 Playing off the majority's admission that
the constitutional text was insufficient to render the Brady Act unconstitutional, the dissent declared, "[t]here is not a clause, sentence, or paragraph
in the entire text of the Constitution . . . that supports the proposition that
a local police officer can ignore a command contained in a statute enacted
by Congress pursuant to an express delegation of power enumerated in
Article 1."190 Furthermore, the dissent noted that Congress merely imposed
temporary burdens on CLEOs to address an "epidemic of gun violence. " 191
Whereas the majority did not explicitly rely upon the Constitution's
text to resolve the issue, the dissent held that the Constitution's text
"provides a sufficient basis for a correct disposition of this case. " 192 Because Article I, Section 8 grants Congress the power to regulate the sale and
transfer of handguns through the Commerce Clause, and because the
Constitution further grants Congress the power "to make all Laws which
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing
powers," 193 Congress has "ample authority" to conscript CLEOs to enforce
the Brady Act's background check provisions. 194 The dissent explicitly
rejected the argument that the Tenth Amendment imposes any limitations on
congressional power not already implicit in Article I, 195 and argued that,
if anything, "federal law may impose greater duties on state officials than
on private citizens" because all government officials must take an oath to
support the Constitution. 1%
The dissent also responded to each prong of the majority opinion's
tripartite analysis. Whereas Justice O'Connor held in New York that the
Frarners sought to give the federal goveunnent the power to directiy
regulate individuals instead of the federal power to regulate states under the
Articles of Confederation, Justice Stevens argued this power was given to

/d.
!d. at 2389.
191
!d. at 2387 (citing H.R. REP. No. 103-344, at 8 (1993)). The dissent also notes that, in its
estimation, the mandatory background check has been a "remarkable success." /d. Of course, the
utilitarian value of mandated background checks, even if accepted, does not speak to the constitutionality of requiring CLEOs to administer them, even if only for a brief time.
192 !d.
193
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
194
Printz, 117 S. Ct at 2387 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
195
Indeed, the dissent quotes from New York that "in a case ... involving the division of authority
between federal and state governments, the two inquiries are mirror images of each other" to suggest
there is no substantive content to the Tenth Amendment /d. at 2388 (citing New York v. United States,
505 U.S. 144, 156 (1992)). Of course, this view implies that the Tenth Amendment was a waste of ink
and parchment
196
!d. (citing U.S. CONST. art VI, cl. 3). The dissent also notes that the Supremacy Clause in
Article VI establishes federal law as "the supreme law of the land." /d.
IB9

190
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the federal government in addition to the power to regulate states. 197 In
support of this claim, Justice Stevens cited Alexander Hamilton, who wrote
that the Constitution, "by extending the authority of the federal head to the
individual citizens of the several States, will enable the government to
employ the ordinary magistracy of each, in the execution of its laws." 198
In particular, Hamilton argued that the federal government would rely upon
state officers and state regulations for the collection of taxes. 199
That early Congresses rarely, if ever, exercised their authority to
commandeer state officials is no "argument against its existence," the
dissent noted. 200 For instance, simply because President Woodrow Wilson
requested state action to implement the draft during World War I, rather
than demanding it, does not mean Wilson could not have issued the
command had he wanted to do so. 201 Justice Stevens also relied upon the
research of Evan Caminkerm to argue that the federal government did
impose duties upon state judges and clerks, if not executive officers themselves, and that some of the functions state judges performed could arguably be characterized as executive in nature. 203 .
On the matter of constitutional structure, the dissent sought to resurrect
the Garcia Court's argument that the structural safeguards preventing
federal infringements upon state sovereignty are purely political and do not
require judicial review of congressional enactments. In Garcia, the Court
held that "[t]he principal means chosen by the Framers to ensure the role of
the States in the federal system lies in the structure of the Federal Government itself."204 In other words, because the states have political clout, it
should be presumed L'lat Congress adequately considered tlJe concerns of

197
"The basic change in the character of the government that the Framers conceived was designed
to enhance the power of the national government, not to provide some new, unmentioned immunity for
state officers." ld. at 2389.
198
THE FEDERALIST No. 27, at 203 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987). Hamilton
then proceeds to explain that this power "Will give the federal government the same advantage for
securing a due obedience to its authority which is enjoyed by the government of each State." Id.
199
See THE FEDERALIST No. 36, at 238 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987). Though
it is unclear whether the federal government ever availed itself of this power.
200
Printz, 117 S. Ct at 2391 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Of course it should be noted that this
argument suggests that there is nothing inherently suspect about an unprecedented exercise of federal
power, a presumption that the majority opinion clearly does not share.
"'' See id. at 2393.
202
See Caminker, supra note 172.
"" See Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2392 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The majority maintained that the
conscription of the state judiciaries is a wholly separate matter from the conscription of executive
officials and legislatures, and that the actions performed by state judges pursuant to federal Jaw were
"quintessentially adjudicative tasks." Id. at 2372 n.2. The dissent responded that this is a "functional,"
as opposed to "formalistic," assessment of the judges' actions which suggests the federal government
was commandeering state officers for executive functions even if it was not commandeering executive
officials. I d. at 2392.
204
Garcia v. San Antonio lvfetro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 550-51 (1985).
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states before imposing obligations upon them/05 even if senators are no
longer directly elected by their respective state legislatures. The dissent
cited the recent passage of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995206
in support of this view, though as discussed above, it is difficult to argue
that passage of this law significantly advanced state concerns about the
proliferation of unfunded mandates. 207 As a fmal structural argument, the
dissent suggested that to curtail the federal government's ability to conscript
states is to invite direct federal intervention into all sorts of local matters. 208
Faced with the precedent in New York, the dissent argued that the issue
presented by the Brady Act is significantly narrower than that presented by
the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments of 1985, and that the
majority has chosen to rest its decision on dicta from the case.209 Moreover, Stevens argued that the other Supreme Court cases the majority cited
favorably, such as Hodel and FERC v. Mississippi, authorized significantly
greater intrusions upon state sovereignty than did the Brady Act. 21 ° Finally, the dissent suggested that the Court's 1947 decision in Testa v. Katf 11
requiring state courts to adjudicate claims brought under federal law should
demonstrate the federal government's ability to commandeer state officials.
Despite these assertions, it is clear from the dissent's historical and structural arguments that its real complaint is not with the holding in Printz, but
that in New York.

"" The dissent reasoned that "[i]t is far more reasonable to presume that [Congress'] decisions to
impose modest burdens on state officials from time to time reflect a considered judgment that the
people in each of the States will benefit therefrom." Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2394 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
For a review of environmental policies that are designed to advance narrow interests, as opposed to
those of the nation as a whole, see Jonathan H. Adler, Rent-Seeking Behind the Green Curtain, REG.,
1996 No. 4, at 26 [hereinafter Adler, Rent-Seeking]. See also ENVIRONMENTAL Pouncs: PuBLIC
COSTS, PRIVATE REWARDS (Michael Greve & Fred L. Smith, Jr., eds., 1992).
206
Pub. L. No. 104-4, 109 Stat. 48 (to be codified at 2 U.S.C. §§ 658-658d, 1501-1504).
207
See Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2395 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Indeed, Stevens' claim that UMRA
"meaningfully addressed" the problems caused by unfunded mandates suggests his unfamiliarity of the
issue, if for no other reason than that UMRA was not retroactive and did nothing to relieve the burden
of preexisting mandates, and imposes minimal burdens for the imposition of new ones. See supra Part
I.A.2.
2D8 See Printz, 111 S. Ct. at 2396 (Stevens, J ., dissenting). Given contemporary budget restraints
and political resistance to new expansions of federal power, this argument rings hollow. More likely,
the federal government would simply seek to regulate less, or enforce certain regulations more
selectively. And even were the majority's decision to invite a swarm of federal officials to descend
upon states and localities, there would be little doubt as to which level of government was responsible
for the new generation of impositions, thereby addressing the concern with accountability that lies at
the heart of both the Printz and New York opinions.
"" See id. at 2398.
210
See id. at 2399. While this may be true, in these two cases the federal government offered to
preempt the states. The Brady Act did not provide for the federal government to assume the CLEOs'
roles if they did not comply.
211
330 u.s. 386 (1947).
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Justice Souter both joined the Stevens dissent and penned another
seeking to uphold both the Brady Act and the New York ruling, which he
had joined.212 His opinion highlights the closeness of the Printz decision,213 as well as the tension between a functional and formalistic view
of federal power. For instance, Souter noted that the early history is
ambiguous, and sided with the dissent based upon his reading of The
Federalist Papers: 214
Congress may not require a state legislature to enact a regulatory scheme ....
But insofar as national law would require nothing from a state officer inconsistent with the power proper to his branch of tripartite state goverrunent ... I
suppose that the reach of federal law as Hamilton described it would not be
exceeded. 215

While Souter's argument has some historical basis/ 16 it creates a
distinction that collapses in practice-at least when applied in a legal
context which recognizes few substantive limits on congressional power. If
a state enacts a regulatory scheme for one purpose, there is nothing to stop
Congress from commandeering the state personnel hired for that purpose to
administer some federal scheme. As far as the state is concerned, Congress
might as well have conscripted the legislature in the first place, for it is left
with no more sovereign ability to make policy and allocate resources than
if it were a mere field office for the federal government. Perhaps recognizing this conundrum, Souter would limit Congress' power in this regard
somewhat, by requiring that the federal government "pay fair value" for the
state's efforts on t.he federal government's behalf.217

212
Justice Breyer also wrote a dissenting opinion, joined by Justice Stevens, that provided a brief
comparative analysis of federalism with other nations.
213
Indeed, it is interesting to note that Souter found the case "closer than I had anticipated."
Printz, 117 S. Ct at 2402 (Souter, J., dissenting). Souter did "not find anything dispositive in the
paucity of early examples of federal employment of state officers for executive purposes," nor would
he "dissent with no more to go on than those few early instances in the administration of naturalization
laws, for example, or such later instances as state support for federal emergency action." /d. at 2401.
214
See id. at 2402. A strong originalist argument for Congress' ability to conscript state executive
officials but not legislatures is laid out in Prakash, supra note 172. See also Caminker, supra note 172;
H. Jefferson Powell, The Oldest Question of Constitutional Law, 19 VA. L. REv. 633, 652-681 (1993).
215
Printz, 117 S. Ct at 2404 (Souter, J., dissenting). On this point Souter is at odds with Stevens,
and his separate dissent explicitly outlines the qualifications that he would add to Stevens' opinion.
216
See generally Prakash, supra note 172.
217
Printz, 117 S. Ct at 2404 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing THE FEDERALisr No. 36). Souter
would turn the unfunded mandate of the Brady Act into a funded one and remand the case due to
Congress' failure to pay for the CLEOs' efforts. The issue Souter did not address is what occurs when
state legislatures explicitly bar executive personnel from engaging in particular functions, such as a
background check, but Congress would call upon them to perform it Such a situation, more likely to
occur if Souter's view were the majority, would pit the autonomy of the state legislature squarely
against the authority of Congress.
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Discussion

The essential holding of Printz was compelled by that of New York. A
formalistic distinction between conscription of legislative and executive
functions breaks down in practice, and would have emptied New York of its
substance. To hire state troopers or any other officials, states must raise
funds and pass authorizing legislation. This power is an essential element of
the state legislature's independence. Insofar as the federal government
commandeers these state employees for other functions, it prevents them
from fulfilling the aims that the state legislature has set for them. 218 Because the resources at any state or local government's disposal are limited,
it can be no other way.
The power of the purse, an inherently legislative function, cannot be
separated from other aspects of legislative power. To allocate resources to
a given priority is to make policy. Even advocates of federal power must
concede that "[r]equiring local and state officials to implement federal
controls represents a serious interference with local political self-determination. "219 When a legislature elects to spend more tax dollars on guns than
butter (or vice-versa), it is making a policy judgment about the needs of its
constituents. To commandeer the resources of a state or local government
is to make policy for the conscripted government by denying the legislature
the ability to make trade-offs. This is particularly true in the case of the
Brady Act which imposed far more than mere "ministerial" burdens on
CLEOs. 220
Federal efforts that conscript state or local officials for all but the most
menial and insubstantial tasks force the legislature to reallocate resources
and/or redefine its policy-making priorities.221 It enables the federal government to say, in effect, "it's swell, County X, that you think you need 50
police officers to keep your homes and streets safe, but we're going to take
half of the available person-hours to fulfill things that we, the Congress,
feel are more important. (P.S. If you don't like it, get your citizens to vote
us out of office.)" As Briffault explains, "[b]y crowding state agendas with
federal programs, and pressuring states to commit their personnel, treasure,

118
Imposing mandates on state and local governments "greatly reduce[s] the discretionary
authority of local governments to make decisions and formulate policies, thus making the local
governments less responsive to their citizens' needs." Freilich & Richardson, supra note 58, at 222.
119
Stewart, supra note 41, at 1210.
110
See Printz v. United States, 854 F. Supp. 1503, 1517 (D. Mont 1994). However, the outcome
of the case likely would have been no different, even if the impositions on Sheriff Printz were
relatively minor.
111
In her concurrence, Justice O'Connor notes that the Court "appropriately refrain[ed] from
deciding whether other purely ministerial reporting requirements imposed by Congrp...ss on state a..r!d
local governments ... are similarly invalid." Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2385 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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and authority to federa1 concerns, these measures can limit the capacity of
the states to pursue their own state-initiated programs."222 The end result
is, in the words of the dissent, to "provide Congress the authority to require
states to enact legislation-a power that affects States far closer to the core
of their sovereign authority." 223 In the majority's words: "to say that the
Federa1 government cannot control the State, but can control all of its
officers is to say nothing of significance."224 Insofar as the federa1 government can conscript state officers in their officia1 capacity as agents of the
state, it can effectively conscript the state itself. 225
In defending the Brady Act background check, the federal government
had sought to ground the legislative-executive distinction in the idea that
"the Brady Act does not require state legislative or executive officia1s to
make policy, but instead issues a fma1 directive to state CLE0s."226 Yet
this argument is no more successful at distinguishing the issues in Printz
from those in New York. The Brady Act required that CLEOs make a "reasonable effort" to conduct the background checks.227 According to the
federa1 government, "since CLEOs themselves are in the 'best position to
determine' what constitutes a 'reasonable effort,'" they will determine what
level of law enforcement resources to devote to checking the records of
prospective gun purchasers.228 Thus, the very language of the Brady Act,
and the government's own description of the duties it imposed, imply a
"policymaking" component to the actions of CLEOs: Should ten personhours-per-day be devoted to background checks or only three? Should
officers be sent to the State Capitol to search relevant records or not? And
so on. As the Court concluded, "[i]t is quite impossible ... to draw the
Government's proposed line at 'no policymaking,' and we would have to
fall back upon a line of 'not too much policymaking. "'229 "Executive
action that has utterly no policymaking component is rare, particularly at an
executive level as high as a jurisdiction's chief law-enforcement offi-

212
Richard Briffault, "What About the 'Ism'?" Normative and Formal Concepts in Contemporary
Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1303, 1352 (1994).
223
Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2388 n.2 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
224
/d. at 2382.
225
In the extreme, one can conceive of a federal law requiring the implementation of a massive
federal scheme by state officers such that no state resources or personnel are available for statemandated functions. It may be extremely unlikely that Congress would enact federal mandates that
severe, but putting the issue in such stark terms illustrates that allowing the conscription of state
officers with impunity would effectively overrule the holding of New York. Moreover, the direct
election of senators does significantly reduce the political barriers to imposing federal mandates at all.
226
Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2380.
227
18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(2) (1994).
,. Brief for the United States at 6-7, Printz, 117 S. Ct. 2365 (No: 95-1478).
229
Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2381. "How much is too much is not likely to be answered precisely; and
an imprecise barrier against federal intrusion upon state authority is not likely to be an effective one."
/d.
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cer."230
The political accountability problems identified by the majority in
Printz are identical to those raised in New York: "By forcing state governments to absorb the fmancial burden of implementing a federal regulatory
program, Members of Congress can take credit for 'solving' problems
without having to ask their constituents to pay for the solutions with higher
federal taxes. " 231 State and local governments must absorb the costs and
face whatever backlash results from implementing a burdensome or otherwise locally unpopular program.232 This, too, undermines the structural
balance the Framers sought to create: "The theory that two governments
accord more liberty than one requires for its realization two distinct and
discernible lines of political accountability: one between the citizens and the
Federal Government; the second between the citizens and the States."233
To argue that the Printz holding rests on New York only begs the
question as to whether New York itself was properly decided. 234 The
majority and dissent present sharply divergent interpretations of constitutional history and evidence of the Framers' intent, neither of which is
dispositive.
In the absence of a clear winner in the historical debate, the most
viable argument for the Printz decision-and, by extension, the decision in
New York-is that such limits on Congress' power are inherent within, or
at least compelled by, the structure of the Constitution. For the Framers, the
federal govermnent was to have very liwited power. ln such circumstances,
whether those limited powers are used to enlist the states in various projects
would be relatively immaterial, as the federal government could only do so
much. Occasional commandeering, like the Commerce Clause itself, would
pose little threat to the sovereignty of states ..
The limited federal government that the Framers thought they had

230

Id. The Court further noted:
[A]ssuming ... that the Brady Act leaves no "policymaking" discretion with the States, we
fail to see how that improves rather than worsens the intrusion upon state sovereignty.
Preservation of the States as independent and autonomous political entities is arguably Jess
undermined by requiring them to make policy in certain fields than ... by "reduc[ing] [them]
to puppets of a ventriloquist Congress."
ld. (citing Brown v. EPA, 521 F.2d 827, 839 (9th Cir. 1975)).
231
/d. at 2382.
232
Compare this argument with- that in New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1992)
(arguing that federal mandates diminish accountability at both the state and federal level).
233
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 576 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
234
There is of course another alternative: New York reached the right result through the wrong
means. For example, the Court could arguably have held that the take title provisions under challenge
violated the guarantee clause of the Constitution due to their imposition on state legislatures, thereby
avoiding the thicket of jurisprudence on federal-state relationships. Of course, the distinction between
federal efforts to conscript legislative and executive personnel is purely formalistic. To allow one and
not the other is to make the initial prohibition a meaningless constraint on federal power.
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created eventually gave way to a bloated regulatory-welfare state, as
O'Connor noted:
The Federal Government undertakes activities today that would have been
unimaginable to the Framers in two senses; first, because the Framers would
not have conceived that any government would conduct such activities; and
second, because the Framers would not have believed that the Federal Government, rather than the States, would assume such responsibilities. 235

Even if one accepts the argument that the Framers intended for Congress to
have the power to conscript executive officials, this power operated within
a constitutional scheme which truly limited the scope of federal power.236
Thus, the power to commandeer state officials would not have posed a
significant threat to state sovereignty. 237
Over the past six decades, the expansion of Commerce Clause power
has eroded state sovereignty, threatening to undermine the entire federal
structure.238 If the enumeration of powers in Article I, Section 8 no longer
serves to limit the scope of congressional power, the Court is faced with
two choices: unearth enforceable limits on federal power from within the
Constitution's structure, or acknowledge that the federal system envisioned
by the Framers is gone. "[T]he core of federalism is the formal legal
position of the states in the federal structure;"239 if that position is not
protected, the structure disintegrates.
The Court has long recognized this dilemma. Even as the Court
aggrandized federal power during the New Deal, it recognized that an allpowerful federal government "would effectually obliterate the distinction
between what is national and what is local and create a completely centralized govemment."240 Therefore, the reinvigoration Of substantive Tenth
Amendment jurisprudence is necessary if the vestiges of federal structure
are to be maintained. 241 As Briffault notes, "[t]he role of the courts is to

235

New York, 505 U.S. at 157.
Moreover, until enactment of the Seventeenth Amendment in 1913, senators were elected by
the state legislatures, and were therefore more likely to defend the interests of states as states, rather
than the broader political preferenCes of the state's citizens.
237
However, Hamilton acknowledged in THE FEDERAliST No. 27 that some Framers Jlid envision
such a threat. See THE FEDERAliST No. 27, at 204 n.37 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick ed.,
1987).
238
"The Constitution does not protect the states from federal Jlisplacement even with respect to
matters that historically were primarily fields of state competence, as recent Supreme Court decisions
sustaining federal legislation in such traJlitional state fields as land use regulation, public utility regulation, and alcoholic beverage consumption demonstrate." Briffault, supra note 222, at 1341 (citations
omitted).
239
ld. at 1352.
240
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937).
241
The only alternative would be for the Court to resurrect pre-New Deal interpretations of the
Commerce Clause. Yet, as shown in Lopez, there is only one justice that will even consider such a
236
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protect the formal features- of the federal structure-the states' fixed
boundaries, territorial integrity, inherent law-making power, and status as
basic units for the organization of the national government ...." 242 The
courts fail to fulfill this function insofar as they stand idly by while federal
power usurps all that was once in the states' domain.
The Garcia argument, that the courts need not police the federal state
relationship, seconded by the dissent, is a passive endorsement of congressional supremacy over state governments. It should be surprising that Justices Brennan and Blackmun, above all others, would be so eager to put
protections contained in the Bill of Rights at the mercy of the political
process. As Justice Powell noted in his Garcia dissent, "[o]ne can hardly
imagine this court saying that because Congress is composed of individuals,
individual rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights are amply protected by
the political process. Yet, the position adopted today [in Garcia] is indistinguishable in principle."243 After all, as Powell noted, the Tenth Amendment is no less a part of the Bill of Rights than the other nine,244 and
eight states made the Tenth Amendment or an equivalent measure a
condition of their ratification of the Constitution. 245 Clearly, it is no more
an empty admonition or ink blot than any other item in the Bill of Rights.
In Printz the Court resoundingly rejects this view, for placing the
protection of state sovereignty in the hands of the Congress inherently
undermines the federalist architecture at the heart of the constitutional system. This holding sits well with Lopez and New York, and demonstrates that
a majority on the present Court takes federalism seriously.
ill. PRINTZ V. UNITED STATES AND THE FuTuRE OF FEDERAL
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION

With its recent federalist trilogy, the Supreme Court has reinvigorated
the notion of dual sovereignty, and set limits-albeit minor ones-Dn the

step, and some otherwise "conservative" justices are openly disdainful of any such effort. See United
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 584 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that the Court's
Commerce Clause jurisprudence should be "more faithful to the original understanding of that clause");
id. at 57 4 (Kennedy, J ., concurring) (noting that stare decisis "forecloses us from reverting to an
understanding of commerce that would serve only an 18th-century economy").
242
Briffault, supra note 222, at 1306.
243
Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 565 n.8 (1985) (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
244
"The Tenth Amendment also is an essential part of the Bill of Rights." Id. Powell expressed
incredulity that the Court took the unprecedented step of "abdicat[ing] responsibility for assessing the
constitutionality of challenged action on the ground that affected parties theoretically are able to look
out for their own interests through the electoral process." Id. at 567 n.l2.
245
ld. at 569 (citing 1-4 DEBATES IN TilE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON TilE ADoPTION OF
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION (Jonathan Elliot, 2d. ed. 1876)).
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scope of congressional power. As noted at the outset, due to the intricate
federal-state relationships in environmental policy, these decisions could
force a reorientation of environmental policy, particularly insofar as the
federal government relies upon states to do its bidding. In the past few
years, there have been several federalist challenges to environmental laws,
and more are certain to follow. 246
Pre-Printz Challenges to Federal Environmental Laws

A.

In the wake of New York v. United States, several state and local
governments initiated challenges to federal environmental mandates, seeking
to show that the Court's prohibition on federal efforts to commandeer state
governments had been violated. 247 Even without the Court's reaffirmation
and extension of the New York doctrine in Printz, federal courts recognized
that not all federal environmental programs could truly be considered
"cooperative" in their design, and invalidated some of the more egregious
examples of federal conscription of state governments.
1.

Board of Natural Resources v. Brown

In 1990, Congress enacted the Forest Resources Conservation and
Shortage Relief Act (FRCSRAV48 Ostensibly a conservation measure, as
written the FRCSRA was clearly designed to protect domestic lumber mills
by restricting the export of unprocessed logs harvested from either federal
or state forests in the Western United States.249 Such a policy would
effectively mandate that timber from Western federal and state lands be processed in local lumber mills.
Tne FRCSRA prohibited all raw log exports from Western states that

246

Since the Supreme Court's decision in Lopez, there have been several Commerce Clause
challenges to environmental laws, including federal wetlands regulations, Superfund, and the
Endangered Species Act See Cargill v. United States; 116 S. Ct. 407 (1995) (denial of certiorari)
(Thomas, J., dissenting); United States v. Wilson, No. 96-4498, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 35971 (4th Cir.
Dec. 23, 1997); Nat'! Ass'n of Home Builders v. Babbitt, No. 96-5354, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 34143
(D.C. Cir. Dec. 5, 1997); United States v. Olin, 107 F.3d 1506 (11th Cir. 1997). However, as of this
writing only one federal appeals court has looked favorably on such a challenge. See Wilson, 1997 U.S.
App. LEXIS at *15 (holding that federal regulations limiting development of wetlands tha~ "could
affect" interstate commerce exceed the scope of the Commerce Clause power).
247
See, e.g., ACORN v. Edwards, 81 F.3d 1387 (5th Cir. 1996); Virginia v. Browner, 80 F.3d 869
(4th Cir. 1996); Board of Natural Resources v. Brown, 992 F.2d 937 (9th Cir. 1993); Missouri v.
United States, 918 F. Supp. 1320 (E.D. Mo. 1996).
248
16 u.s.c. §§ 620-620j (1994).
249
See id. § 620 (b). The law's export restrictions only applied to government lands in the
continental United States west of the I OOth meridian. See id. § 620c.
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sell 400 million board feet or less per year. 250 States that sell more than
400 million board feet were initially only prohibited from exporting 75
percent of their annual sales. 251 At the time the FRCSRA was enacted,
only Washington State had annual timber sales in excess of 400 million
board feet 252 In October 1992, the Secretary of Commerce, pursuant to
the Act, extended the export prohibition to all timber from Western government lands irrespective of timber volume. 253 Yet, rather than prohibit the
timber exports directly, the FRCSRA required states to issue their own
regulations to implement the export bans. 254
The FRCSRA significantly impacted Western states. Prior to its
passage, Washington State sold a majority of the timber harvested off of
state lands overseas due to more favorable market conditions. The revenues
from state timber sales were largely used to fmance public education and
county governments. It was estimated that the FRCSRA would result in
over $500 million in lost revenues. 255 Faced with this possibility, the
Washington State Board of Natural Resources and Board of Education filed
suit arguing, inter alia, the FRCSRA violated the Tenth Amendment 256
In 1993, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held unconstitutional those
provisions of the FRCSRA that called upon states to implement regulations
to prohibit the export of unprocessed timber. 257 Explicitly relying upon the
Supreme Court's decision in New York, the Ninth Circuit found that the
challenged portions of the FRCSRA were "direct commands to the states to
regulate according to Congress' instructions, and thus violate the principle
that the 'Federal Government may not compel the States to enact or
administer a federal regulatory program. "'25 g
The federal government sought to defend the FRCSRA by arguing that
(a) Washington State could avoid having to implement the export ban by
ending timber sales from state lands, and (b) the Act's directives to the
states constituted precatory admonitions rather than legally enforceable
commands. The Ninth Circuit found neither of these arguments persuasive.

250

See id. § 620c(b)(l).
See id. § 620c(b)(2).
252
See Brown, 992 F.2d at 941.
253
See id.
254
See 16 U.S.C. § 620c(d). Under this section of the Act, "[e]ach State shall determine the
species, grade, and geographic origin of unprocessed timber to be prohibited from export ... and shall
administer such prohibitions consistent with the intent [of the Act] ... " and "the Governor of each
state to which [the Act) applies ... shall ... issue regulations to carry out the purposes of this
section ...." By directing the governor to issue regulations, these regulations parallel those of the
Brady Act struck down in Printz.
255
See Brown, 992 F.2d at 941.
256
The suits also alleged that the FRCSRA violates the Fifth Amendment's due process clause and
federal obligations to land grant trusts. See id. at 942.
157
See id. at 946. The Court upheld the FRCSRA as against the other challenges.
258
!d. at 947.
251
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In the first instance, the Ninth Circuit held that forcing states to choose
between implementing export controls and ceasing all timber sales from
state lands was the sort of "Hobson's choice" that New York explicitly
invalidated.259 The Ninth Circuit held that the FRCSRA "represents an
alternative, halting all timber sales, that Congress has no authority to
command."260 In the second instance, the court recalled that there is a
"long line of Supreme Court decisions upholding 'the power of federal
courts to order State officials to comply with federal law. "'261 The
FRCSRA's lack of its own independent enforcement mechanism did not
change the mandatory character of the challenged provisions. 262

2.

ACORN v. Edwards

In 1996, as the various Brady Act cases were winding their way
through the federal court system, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals struck
down another environmental statute for infringing upon state sovereignty.
The case, ACORN v. Edwards/63 arose when the Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now (ACORN) and two parents in Louisiana
sought to enjoin state executive officials to comply with the Lead Contamination Control Act (LCCA) of 1988?64 The case was initially dismissed
as moot, but the plaintiffs sought and obtained attorney's fees, a decision
from which the Louisiana state officials appealed. On appeal, the Fifth
Circuit reversed the district court's fee award on the grounds that "the
Plaintiffs failed to allege a violation of a lawful requirement of the Act"
because the relevant portion of the LCCA was unconstitutional. 265
Congress enacted the LCCA to reduce the perceived risks of childhood
lead poisoning from lead-lined water tanks or water coolers containing lead
solder.266 Two provisions of the LCCA imposed requirements upon states.
The first ordered each state to disseminate information on models of water
coolers that may contain lead solder or lead-lined tanks to schools and other

""' /d.
260
/d. The Court may well have stepped beyond New York with this argument, as it is unclear that

Congress could not shut down timber sales on state lands if it so desired.
261
Id. (citing New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 179 (1992)).
262
In response to the court's decision, Congress amended the FRCSRA, instructing the Secretary
of Commerce to issue federal regulations directly proscribing the export of unprocessed timber. See 16
u.s.c. §§ 620c-620d.
263
81 F.3d 1387 (5th Cir. 1996).
264
42 u.s.c. §§ 300j-21-26 (1994).
265
ACORN, 81 F.3d at 1388.
266
While there is little debate that high-level lead exposure poses a health threat, particularly to
children, there is some debate as to how serious the threat is at low exposure levels. See, e.g.,
CASSANDRA CHRONES MOORE, HAUNTED HOUSING: HOW TOXIC ScARE STORIES ARE SPOOKING TilE
Pul!uc Our OF HOUSE AND HOME 79-158 (1997).
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educational institutions.267 The second mandated that each state "shall
establish a program ... to assist local educational agencies in testing for,
and remedying, lead contamination in drinking water .... " 268 The court
only considered the constitutionality of the second requirement, holding that
the state had effectively complied with the first provision and that the court
should "avoid unnecessary resolution of constitutional questions."269 Nevertheless, had both provisions been challenged it is likely that both would
have met the same fate.
ACORN argued that insofar as Congress acted under its delegated
powers in Article I, there is no Tenth Amendment obstacle to imposing
burdens on states. Relying on New York, the Fifth Circuit held otherwise,
noting that "[t]he Tenth Amendment ... incorporates extra-textual limitations upon Congress' exercise of its Article I powers.'mo That Congress
has the power to regulate lead-contaminated water coolers was immaterial,
as the challenged portion of the LCCA fell "squarely within the ambit of
New York." 271 The court held that "[b]ecause § 300j-24(d) deprives States
of the option to decline regulating non-lead free drinking water coolers,
we ... conclude that§ 300j-24(d) is an unconstitutional intrusion upon the
States' sovereign prerogative to legislate as it sees ftt."272
Section 300j-24(c) escaped the Fifth Circuit's scrutiny because Louisiana officials had effectively complied with its requirement that they
distribute information on lead-contaminated water coolers to educational
institutions. Under Printz, however, this provision would be struck down as
an unconstitutional infringement upon state sovereignty, even if a court
ruled that the information distribution requirement did not require any
legislative action by the state. In simple terms, if the federal government
wants educational institutions to receive information about lead-contamination, it is free to either (a) provide states with &'1 incentive to undei..ake the
distribution voluntarily (which Louisiana effectively did), or (b) distribute
the information itself. It cannot call upon executive officers to meet its
ends.

1
'"

See 42 U.S.C. § 300j-24(c).
/d. § 300j-24(d).
269
ACORN, 81 F.3d at 1392.
270
/d. at 1393.
271
/d. at 1394. The Court explained that "Congress· is free, pursuant to its Commerce Clause
power, to combat lead contamination in drinking water by regulating drinking water coolers that move
in interstate commerce. Such regulation, however, must operate directly upon the people, and not the
States as conduits to the people." /d.
272 !d.
268
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Federal Environmental Laws Vulnerable to Challenge Under Printz

B.

Justice Stevens' dissent in Printz explicitly acknowledged that in
striking down the Brady Act's background check, the Court would also be
effectively declaring other federal laws which impose ministerial requirements on state executives to be unconstitutional. 273 Justice Stevens cited
several federal laws fitting this description. 274 Two of these, sections of
the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA) and
the federal statute requiring the collection of data on Underground Storage
Tanks, are environmental. Insofar as these environmental programs mandate
state participation, they are as constitutionally suspect as the FRCSRA and
LCCA.
1.

The Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act

The Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act
(EPCRA) was enacted in 1986 as Title m of the Superfund Amendments
and Reauthorization Act. 275 The purpose of EPCRA is to ensure that local
communities are informed about potential environmental threats from
hazardous materials and that local governments develop emergency plans in
case such threats materialize. Among other things, it requires businesses and
governmental entities to inform local authorities of releases from their
facilities. 276
EPCRA poses some difficulty for cooperative federalism because it
also imposes concrete obligations on the governor of each state. In particular, EPCRA requires that "the Governor of each State shall appoint a State
emergency response commission."277 If the governor fails to take such
action, then "the Governor shall operate as the State emergency response
commission until the Governor makes such designation.'ms The commission, which may simply consist of the governor herself, "shall designate

273

The possibility that numerous federal statutes may be invalidated should not detennine the
outcome of a Supreme Court ruling. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (holding unicameral
legislative veto is unconstitutional, despite its frequent enactment).
n• See Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct 2365, 2394 (1997) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing 40
Stat 80-1 (registration of young adults for the draft), 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001, 11003 (creation of response
commissions for release of hazardous substances), 42 U.S.C. § 6991a (data collection and reporting on
underground storage tanks), 23 U.S.C. § 402(a) (reporting traffic fatalities), and 42 U.S.C. § 5779 (a)
(reporting missing children)).
ns Pub. L. No. 99-499 (1986). Superfund is the common name of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Cleanup, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9674 (1994).
n• See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 11004 (1994).
m ld. § i iOOi(a) (1994) (emphasis added).
na /d. (emphasis added).
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emergency planning districts" and "[i]n making such designation, ... shall
indicate which facilities subject to the requirements of this subtitle are
within such emergency planning district" and "shall appoint members of a
local emergency planning committee for each emergency planning district."279 The commission (or the governor herself) also "shall review" the
plans developed by local emergency committees, and "make recommendations . . . to ensure coordination of such plans with emergency response
plans of other emergency planning districts."280 The commission must also
collect emergency and hazardous chemical inventory forms from covered
facilities and make such information available to members of the public
who file written requests for such information?81 Finally, the governor,
commission, or local committee "shall [make] available to the general
public" emergency response plans and information provided by covered facilities. 282 Failure to fulfill these duties can subject the governor or the
commission to citizen suits. 283 In sum, EPCRA mandates that state executive officers, indeed the governor herself, take specific actions, including
creating what are effectively new state agencies. 284
The foregoing should make clear that EPCRA directly commands the
governor of each state to fulfill certain functions. This is an explicit
violation of the Court's holding in Printz that "[t]he Federal Government
may neither issue directives requiring the States to address particular
problems, nor command the States' officers, or those of their political
subdivisions, to administer or enforce a federal regulatory program. " 285
Unlike the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments, there is
nothing in EPCRA that gives states an option as to whether to comply.
There is no regulatory scheme or pot of money that the state can give up to
avoid EPCP,..l~·.. 's requirements. 286 Ivloreover, there are no provisions iii

219
ld. §§ llOOl(b)-(c) (emphasis added). The emergency planning committees themselves have
additional obligations to provide public notice for their activities, hold public meetings, and distribute
an emergency plan. See id. § llOOl(c). Moreover, the committees must prepare and annually revise an
emergency plan that, among other things, designates community emergency coordinators, provides for
community notification of releases, develops evacuation plans and develops training programs. See id.
§ 11003(c).
280
Id. § ll003(e) (emphasis added).
281
See id. §§ 11022(a), (e)(3).
282
ld. § ll044{a).
283
See id. §§ 11046(a)(l)(C), (D).
284
"It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the commission and the committees are state
regulatory agencies .... By ordering governors to create and fund state regulatory agencies, EPCRA
forces the executive branch to exercise legislative powers in violation of core separation of powers
principles." Nicholas J. Johnson, EPCRA's Collision with Federalism, 27 IND. L. REv. 549, 563-64
.
(1994).
2l!l Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365, 2384 (1997).
286
Although in some cases this may not matter. See Board of Natural Resources v. Brown, 992
F.2d 937, 947 (9th Cir. 1993).
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EPCRA that suggest failure to abide by its strictures will simply result in
the state's loss of specific federal funding. 287 In that context, the language
of EPCRA cannot be viewed as discretionary or "precatory admonitions
rather than commands." Such an argument "ignores the long line of
Supreme Court decisions upholding 'the power of federal courts to order
State officials to comply with federal law,"'288 and EPCRA's own language authorizing citizen suits to achieve the same purpose.289 Under
Printz, it is difficult to conclude that substantial portions of EPCRA are not
unconstitutional.290

2.

Underground Storage Tanks

In 1984, Congress enacted the Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984291 which amended the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act of 1976 (RCRA). 292 This legislation included provisions for the regulation of underground storage tanks (USTs), and the approval of state
programs for such regulation under the traditional cooperative federalism
model. 293 In 1986, provisions were added which are non-discretionary
requirements contrary to the holding of Printz. Specifically, the UST
provisions declare that "[e]ach State shall make 2 separate inventories of all
underground storage tanks in such State containing regulated substances."294 In addition, "each State shall submit such aggregated data to the
Administrator [of the Environmental Protection Agency]."295 These provisions are wholly separate from the regulatory provisions that can be
included in a discretionary state UST regulatory program.296

287
Indeed, EPCRA provides for no financial assistance to states whatsoever. It merely authorizes
"such sums as may be necessary to carry out" its provisions. 42 U.S.C. § 11050.
288
Brown, 992 F.2d at 947 (quoting New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 179 (1992)).
m See 42 U.S.C. §§ 11046(a)(I)(C), (D).
290
Also, given that these provisions of EPCRA are central to its structure in that without the state
commissions most other provisions of the Act are inoperable, the entire statute may be void.
The standard for determining the severability of an unconstitutional provision is well
established: "Unless it is evident that the legislature would not have enacted those provisions
which are within its power, independently of that which is not, the invalid part may be
dropped if what is left is fully operative as a law."
Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 684 (1987) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. I, 108
(1976)).
291
Pub. L. No. 98-616, 98 Stat 3221 (1984).
292
42 u.s.c. §§ 6901-6992.
293
See id. § 699 I.
294
/d. § 6991a(c).
29
' Id. (emphasis added). The law also imposes specific requirements upon the owners of USTs to
report various information about their USTs to "the State or local agency or department designated" by
the Governor to receive such information. See id. §§ 6991a(a)(I), (b)(I).
296
See id. § 6991c. The elements of a state program are listed in 42 U.S.C. § 699Ic(a). Where
ihere is no state program in place, the EPA regulates directly pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 6991b, a section
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There is no doubt that the requirements imposed on states under the
UST law are less burdensome than those contained in EPCRA or even in
the Brady Act itself. However, the language of Printz does not admit any
exceptions for de minimis or negligible intrusions. Rather, the Court was
clear: "It matters not whether policymaking is involved, and no case-bycase weighing of the burdens or benefits is necessary; such commands are
fundamentally incompatible with our constitutional system of dual sovereignty."297 By this standard, it would seem that the UST reporting and
record keeping requirements are as constitutionally suspect as the relevant
portions of EPCRA.
C.

Cooperative Federalism or Coercive Mandates: The Case of the
Clean Air Act

For cooperative federalism to be constitutional, it must be truly
cooperative. The_ federal government can bribe states with the promise of
federal funds or threaten states with sanctions. However, it can neither
direct state legislatures nor commandeer state executive officials. A formalistic division between these two types of federal action is possible, but it is
likely to be arbitrary in practice. Conditional spending can be the basis for
greater intrusions on state sovereignty than the administrative burdens struck
down in Printz. Though the Supreme Court has supported the cooperative
federalism model, it has also acknowledged that "in some circumstance the
fmancial inducement offered by Congress might be so coercive as to pass
the point at which 'pressure turns into compulsion.'"298
It is fairly clear that those enviromnental progra..."'ls L~at are less
cooperative in their federalism are constitutionally suspece99 However,

separate from the notification requirements imposed directly upon states.
297
Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct 2365, 2384 (1997). But see id. at 2385 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) ("[T]he Court appropriately refrains from deciding whether other purely ministerial
reporting requirements imposed by Congress on state and local authorities pursuant to its Commerce
Clause powers are similarly invalid.").
298
South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 2ll (1987) (citing Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301
u.s. 548, 590 (1937)).
299
There is an exception to this general statement in the case of those federal programs that
impose similar requirements on both private and governmental entities across the board. For example,
the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA), Pub. L. No. 93-523, 88 Stat 1661 (1974), imposes requirements
upon all water systems that maintain at least fifteen connections or regularly service more than twentyfive people, irrespective of whether it is owned and operated by a state or local government or a private
firm. This sort of regulation is constitutional insofar as it represents a valid exercise of Congress'
Commerce Clause power (a debatable point) as it does not regulate states qua states. Other examples
of neutral environmental regulations that apply to both state and local governments and private firms
would be emission standards, automotive fleet alternative fuel vehicle requirements, and employee
carpooling rules. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (upholding the
application of the Fair Labor Standards Act to government employers).
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insofar as some ostensibly "cooperative" federal environmental programs
become coercive in their implementation, they may suffer from constitutional defects as well. In particular, insofar as Congress' spending power is not
subject to constitutional constraints, it threatens to swallow whole the state
sovereignty protected by Printz. For just as the dissent's reasoning in Printz
would have blown a hole in the protections offered by New York, an
unconstrained conditional spending power can emasculate the federalist
protections found by the Court in the past five years.
In 1995, two states filed constitutional challenges to portions of the
Clean Air Act in federal court.300 Though neither challenge was successful, these two cases demonstrate that states increasingly question the extent
to which their relationship to the federal government is truly "cooperative"
in the context of environmental law. These cases suggest that if the principles underlying the New York, Lopez, and Printz decisions are to be vindicated, the Supreme Court may need to ensure that cooperative federalism
lives up to the first part of its name.
1.

Court Challenges to the Clean Air Act

The Clean Air Acf01 is arguably the most contentious environmental
law ever enacted. The Act is sweeping in its scope and has, at times, sought
to encourage land use control, restrictions on personal automobile use, and
outright bans on new development in urban areas that fail to meet federal
standards. Over the past three decades there has been "substantial friction
and resistance by states, EPA, and the regulated community to implementing the immensely costly requirements of the Clean Air Act, thereby
requiring substantial expenditure of regulatory oversight resources and
imposing costly litigation."302
The cost and intrusiveness of federal air pollution regulations has
sparked fierce criticism. The 1990 Amendments to the Act are widely
considered to be the single most expensive piece of environmental legislation ever enacted. 303 The perception that the Act is inflexible and ineffi-

300

See Virginia v. Browner, 80 F.3d 869 (4th Cir. 1996); Missouri v. United States, 918 F. Supp.
1320 (E.D. Mo. 1996), vacated, 109 F.3d 440 (8th Cir. 1997).
"'' 42 u.s.c. §§ 7401-766lf (1994).
302
Joshua D. Sarnoff, The Continuing Imperative (but only from a National Perspective) for
Federal Environmental Protection, 7 DUKE ENvTL. L. & POL'Y F. 225, 307 (1997).
"'' For example, the ozone non-attainment provisions of the Clean Air Act alone are estimated to
cost $11.2 billion per year. See Kenneth W. Chilton & Stephen Huebner, Has the Battle Against Urban
Smog Become "Mission Impossible?", 1996 CENTER FOR TilE STUDY OF AM. Bus. 136. With the
recent promulgation of new air quality standards, the costs of the Clean Air Act ozone and particulate
matter non-attainment provisions will continue to increaSe, by as much as $55 billion per year. See
Kenneth W. Chilton & Stephen Huebner, Beyond the Air Quality Dust Cloud: Fundamental Issues
Raised by the Air Quality Proposals, 1997 CENTER FOR TilE STUDY OF AM. Bus. 183.
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cient also fosters political opposition. 304 Since 1970, the Act has impressed
states into regulating air quality in line with federal dictates through the
State Implementation Plan (SIP) process. Beginning soon thereafter, states
have resisted.
All states with metropolitan areas that do not attain the National
Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) for criteria air pollutants must
develop SIPs which they submit to the EPA for its approval. Among other
things, an adequate SIP must include "enforceable emission limitations ...
as well as schedules and timetables for compliance/'305 monitoring systems,306 a fee-based permitting system for stationary sources,307 an enforcement program/08 and provide for sufficient public participation in the
SIP process. 309 The 1990 Amendments also added Title V, which requires
states to develop an omnibus permitting program for stationary sources,310
complete with permit fees deemed sufficient by the EPA to cover the cost
of implementation, 311 and outlined numerous specific control measures that
non-attainment areas must include in their SIP. 312 "In short, the states'
role, if they accept, is subject to a great deal of federal specification,
oversight and approval."313 Failure to submit an adequate SIP by the
appropriate deadlines314 results in the imposition of federal sanctions,
including the loss of federal highway funds, increased offset requirements
for new development, and the imposition of a Federal Implementation Plan
(FIP) that the EPA will enforce.315 Moreover, local transportation projects
cannot receive federal funding unless they conform to an EPA-approved
SIP. 316 Although the Clean Air Act fits the cooperative model in that it
offers states the choice of allowing the federal government to take over air

304

See K.H. Jones & Jonathan Adler, Time to Reopen the Clean Air Act: Clearing Away the
Regulatory Smog, CATO INST. POL'Y ANALYSIS, July 11, 1995, at 1.
305
42 U.S.C. § 74IO(a)(2)(A).
306
See id. § 7410(a)(2)(B).
307
See id. § 74IO(a)(2)(L).
308
See id. §§ 7410(a)(2)(C), (E).
309

States must provide "reasonable notice" and public bearings on SIPs, and consult with affected
local entities. !d. § 7410(a)(2)(M).
310
See id. § 765lo. For a critique of Title V, see BEN LIEBERMAN, TITLE V OF TilE CLEAN AIR
Acr: WILL AMERICA'S INDUSTRIAL Fl.mJRE BE l'ERMriTED (CEI 1995).
311
This is the sort of measure that illustrates the potential accountability problem when the federal
govermnent relies upon states to administer federal policy. As David Schoenbrod notes, through Title
V "unelected federal officials supplanted much of the budgetary and taxing authority of elected state
officials" through their ability to approve or reject state permit fee schedules. Schoenbrod, supra note
49, at 265.
312
See 42 U.S.C. § 75ll(a).
313
Dwyer, supra note 32, at 1194.
314
Different regions face different deadlines dependent upon their air quality designation. See 42
U.S.C. § 7509(a).
315
See id. § 7509(b).
316
See id. § 7506.
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quality regulation, such a decision would come at tremendous cost.
The sponsors of the original legislation clearly intended for the federal
government to tell states what to do. Congressman Staggers, who managed
the Clean Air Act on the floor in 1970, explained that:
If we left it all to the Federal Government, we would have about everybody on
the payroll of the United States. We know this is not practical. Therefore the
Federal Government sets the standards, we tell the States what they must do
and what standards they must meet. These standards must be put into effect by
the communities and the States, and we expect them to have the men to do the
actual enforcing.317

However, contemporary legal authority for such impositions was certainly
lacking,318 prompting several states to challenge the law.
Indeed, in 1973, several states submitted inadequate or incomplete
SIPs, in outright defiance of the EPA's demands. The EPA responded by
including requirements that state officials implement transportation control
measures and land-use regulations at state expense as part of the FIP.319
Several state and local governments took exception to the EPA's
attempts to force them to implement federal regulations. They successfully
challenged the EPA's measures in federal courts. 320 While the states'
victories were on statutory grounds, several courts expressed serious
reservations about the constitutional legitimacy of the EPA's actions. In
particular, the courts separated federal efforts to control pollution from
industrial sources that impact state-run facilities from federal efforts to
directly conscript state officers in the administration of a federal program.
Upholding the EPA's actions, in the Ninth Circuit's view, would have
endorsed "[a] Commerce [Oause] Power so expanded [that it] would reduce
the states to puppets of a ventriloquist Congress."321 Such a power "would
enable Congress to control ever increasing portions of the states' budgets.
The pattern of expenditures by states would increasingly become a Congres317

116 CONG. REc. 19,204 (1970) (statement of Rep. Staggers).
"But the matter would be very different were Congre&s to invoke the commerce power as a
justification for compelling state and local governments to implement federal environmental policies.
There is no close precedent, historical or legal, supporting such an undertaking." Stewart, supra note
41, at 1223.
319
Among the requirements pushed by EPA were bus and carpool lanes, vehicle emission
inspection programs, increased parking fees at municipal facilities, and other measures. Subject states
were required to find the funds to fulfill these requirements, and the EPA asserted that it could bring
legal action against state officials that did not comply.
""' See Maryland v. EPA, 530 F.2d 215 (4th Cir. 1975), vacated sub nom., EPA v. Brown, 431
U.S. 99 (1977); Brown v. EPA, 521 F.2d 827 (9th Cir. 1975), vacated, 431 U.S. 99 (1977); District of
Columbia v. Train, 521 F.2d 971 (D.C. Cir. 1975), vacated sub nom., EPA v. Brown, 431 U.S. 99
(1977). A fourth federal appeals court found in favor of the EPA. See Pennsylvania v. EPA, 500 F.2d
246 (3rd Cir. 1974).
321
Brown, 521 F.2d at 839.
318
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sional responsibility. " 322
After losing in federal court, the EPA appealed a portion of the rulings
to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court accepted certiorari, but the EPA
backed off of its position, and conceded that it had exceeded its statutory
authority, if not constitutional limitations, and the cases were declared
moot. 323 There is little doubt that if the cases were litigated today, the
EPA's effort to conscript state and local officials would be invalidated
under Printz and New York.
The 1970 court battles were hardly the last conflicts between the
federal and state governments. over implementation of the Clean Air Act.
After passage of the 1990 Amendments, state and local governments loudly
protested EPA regulations on automobile emission inspection programs,324
carpool regulations/25 and permitting program requirements. 326 More recently, states took the EPA back to court, raising constitutional objections
to its uncooperative approach to "cooperative federalism."
Virginia and Missouri, respectively, challenged the imposition of
sanctions under the Clean Air Act. 327 Both states alleged that the EPA's
decision, if not the statutory provisions authorizing sanctions themselves,
were unconstitutional infringements upon state sovereignty. According to
the states, the Clean Air Act impermissibly authorized the EPA to impose
severe sanctions upon those states that fail to comply with the EPA's
interpretation of the Act. 328 In particular, the Clean Air Act authorizes the
EPA to withhold federal highway funds, to increase the "offset" requirements that companies wishing to locate in a non-complying area must
meet/ 29 and to preempt the state regulatory program altogether. 330 Impo-

322
/d. at 840. "In essence, the Administrator is here attempting to commandeer the regulatory
powers of the states, along with their personnel and resources, for use in administering and enforcing
a federal regulatory program against the owners of motor vehicles." Train, 521 F.2d at 992.
323
See Brown, 431 U.S. 99.
324
See Dwyer, supra note 32, at 1208-16.
315
The federal carpool mandate, which was to be imposed in the eight smoggiest metropolitan
areas, was rescinded by Congress in 1995. See Clean Air Act Optional Employer Mandated Trip
Reduction, Pub. L. No. 104-70, 109 Stat 773 (1995) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 751la). It was the first
use of a new "correction" procedure designed by House Republicans to expedite minor changes to
regulatory laws needed to "correct" otherwise absurd regulatory requirements.
326
See Carrie Shook, Title V Terror: Clean Air 'Sleeper' Clause Comes to Haunt, Bus. FIRsTCOLUMBUS, Oct 23, 1995, at 21. The administrative costs of Title Von states are significant In 1995,
the Ohio Environmental Protection Agency estimated that it would have to add 100 to 150 new staff
to implement the program in accordance with federal guidelines. See LIEBERMAN supra note 310, at I,
12.
3
n See Virginia v. Browner, 80 F.3d 869 (4th Cir. 1996); Missouri v. United States, 918 F. Supp.
1320 (E.D. Mo. 1996).
328
Virginia also argued that the EPA was wrong to conclude that Virginia's stationary source
permit program failed to comply with Title V of the Clean Air Act See Browner, 80 F.3d at 872.
329
If a company wishes to build a new factory in a non-attainment area, it must make investments
to reduce pollution to offset the new facility's marginal contribution to local air pollution. When states
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sition of either of these first two sanctions, Missouri claimed, would
produce irreparable harm to the state, due to the magnitude of funding at
stake and the impact that heightened offset requirements would have upon
private development within the state.331 Virginia made a similar case. 332
Neither state was successful.
According to the Fourth Circuit, the Clean Air Act's provisions pass
constitutional muster "because although its sanctions provisions potentially
burden the states, those sanctions amount to inducement rather than 'outright coercion."'333 The District Court in Missouri reached a similar
conclusion, relying upon dicta in New York that "conditions [on receipt of
federal funds] must ... bear some relationship to the purpose of federal
spending."334 For the Missouri court, "the appropriate focus is not on the
alleged impact of a statute on a particular state program or economy but
whether Congress has 'directly compel[led]' the state 'to enact a federal
regulatory program. "'335 While the Missouri court only addressed the
question of whether such sanctions were unconstitutional on their face, it
implied that an as-applied challenge would not fare any better.336
2.

Commandeering through Conditional Spending

In the wake of Printz, the key question raised by the Virginia v.
Browner and Missouri litigation for federal environmental law is whether

imposing conditions upon a state's receipt of federal funds can ever rise to
the level of being coercive. Both the Fourth Circuit and the Missouri
District Court relied upon South Dakota v. Dole337 to uphold making
continued disbursement of highway funds conditional upon satisfactory
implementation of the Clean Air Act. 338 This reliance on Dole may be
misplaced. As Justice O'Connor noted in her Dole dissent:
When Congress appropriates money to build a highway, it is entitled to

fail to comply, the EPA may increase the proportion of offsets required from 1.15:1 to 2:1. See 42
§ 7509(b)(2).
330
See id. § 7661a(d)(3). It should be noted, however, that exceptions are made for certain types
of highway projects, such as those that are necessary to save lives or reduce pollution. See infra note
353.
331
See Missouri, 918 F. Supp. at 1326.
332
See Browner, 80 F.3d at 874.
333
/d. at 88 I.
334
Missouri, 918 F. Supp. at 1333 (citing New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167 (1992))
(emphasis in Missouri opinion).
335
/d. at 1328 (citing New York, 505 U.S. at 161).
336
See id. at 1329. Missouri had sought to challenge the provisions on both grounds, but the
District Court determined that an as-applied claim was not yet ripe.
337
483
203 (1987).
338
See Browner, 80 F..3d at 881-82; lrfissouri, 918 F. Supp. at i330, 1332-34.

u.s.c.

u.s.
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insist that the highway be a safe one. But it is not entitled to insist as a condition of the use of highway funds that the State impose or change regulations in
other areas of the State's social and economic life because of an attenuated or
tangential relationship to highway use or safety. 339

In Dole, the Court held that "Congress may attach conditions on the
receipt of federal funds, and has repeatedly employed the power 'to further
broad policy objectives by conditioning receipt of federal moneys upon
compliance by the recipient with federal statutory and administrative
directives."'340 In particular, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of Congress' withholding five percent of highway funds from
states which refused to raise the drinking age to twenty-one. Nonetheless,
the Court acknowledged that the spending power "is of course not unlimited,"341 and cannot be used to coerce states into enacting unrelated programs. Conditional spending must "be in pursuit of 'the general welfare,"'
and any conditions imposed by Congress must be unambiguous, and related
to the federal interest in the program in question. 342 Moreover, the Court
held that "other constitutional provisions may provide an independent bar
to the conditional grant of federal funds." 343
The reasons for limiting the use of conditional spending to affect state
policies should be rather clear. One could imagine a situation in which
every payment from the federal government to states is conditioned upon
acquiescence to every jot and iota of federal dictates. Well prior to Printz,
commentators noted that "such a broad reading of congressional power
would ::~fford Congress a way to exercise the spending power where it is not
spending, by drafting grant conditions that reach areas in which the state
has accepted no funds." 344 The conditional grant of funds could eliminate
the element of choice that must remain when the federal government seeks
to enlist state assistance and emasculate the Printz decision.
If the holding in Dole is to place any meaningful restraint upon

339

Dole, 483 U.S. at 216 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
'"' Dole, 483 U.S. at 206 (citing Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 474 (1980)). Relevant to
this discussion is the fact that the Court also held that the "Tenth Amendment limitation on congressional regulation of state affairs [does] not concomitantly limit the range of conditions legitimately placed
on federal grants." ld. at 210. The petitioners in Dole sought to argue that Congress' use of the
spending power to induce states to raise the drinking age violated state sovereignty, particularly the
provisions of the 21st Amendment which leave the regulation of alcohol to the states.
341
ld. at 207.
342

/d.

"' ld. at 208.
344
Stewart, supra note 41, at 1261. More recently, Albert Rosenthal noted that "what is decided
with respect to [conditional] spending could render irrelevant many generally accepted doctrines
concerning the powers of and limitations upon the federal government ...." Alben Rosenthal,
Conditional Federal Spending and the Constitution, 39 STAN. L. REv. 1103, 1106 (1987). See also
Lynn Baker, Conditional Federal Spending After Lopez, 95 COLiiM. L. REV. 19ii (1995).
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Congress' exercise of the spending power, there must be some substantive
component to the Dole test. In an earlier case the Court explained that "the
Federal Government may establish and impose reasonable conditions
relevant to federal interest in the project and to the over-all objectives
thereof."345 If Congress is not limited in this manner, "the spending power
could render academic the Constitution's other grants and limits of federal
authority."346 However, because the Supreme Court has yet to invalidate
a congressional effort to induce state cooperation through conditional spending, few lower courts have been willing to do so.347
Nonetheless, it is not clear that threatening federal highway moneys
falls squarely within the Dole holding. 348 Highway funds are raised from
a dedicated revenue source in gasoline taxes and placed in the Highway
Trust Fund. These moneys are explicitly earmarked for transportation
projects?49 The authorizing legislation suggests many reasons why federal
funding of highway construction supports the "general welfare," but
environmental protection is not one of them. In Dole, on the other hand,
both the highway legislation and the drinking age increase were explicitly
enacted to improve safety. The connection between the Clean Air Act's
purpose and transportation is also ambiguous, as states can lose their
highway funding solely for failing to comply with Title V, a portion of the
Act that only deals with stationary sources.
It is certainly true that the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1970 instructed
the Secretary of Transportation to ensure that federal highway programs
were "consistent with any approved plan for the implementation of any am..:
bient air quality standard for any air quality control region designated
pursuant to the Clean Air Act, as amended." 350 Similarly, the lntermodal
Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 (ISTEA) 351 establishes that
Congress sought to create an environmentally sound interstate highways
system. Neither of these statutes, however, establishes that a purpose of
federal highway programs is environmental protection-the relationship test
set forth in Dole. These statutory provisions provide an indication of what

3

Ivanhoe Irrigation DisL v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275, 295 (1958).
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167 (1992). See Baker, supra note 344, at 1920.
347
See, e.g., Clarke v. United States, 886 F.2d 404 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (holding that conditioning of
federal appropriations for the District of Columbia on the passage of specified legislation is unconstitutional).
348
Though it is certain they would fall outside the test articulated by Justice O'Counor in her
dissenL Dole, 483 U.S. at 216 (O'Counor, 1., dissenting).
349
Of course, many would argue that the "trust fund" system within the federal budget is all
smoke-and-mirrors. Whether or not this is true when the issue is deficit reduction, a strong argument
can be made that the federal government has a moral, if not legal, obligation to expend money from
the trust fund for road purposes and nothing else.
350
Pub. L. No. 91-605, § 136(b), 84 StaL 1713 (1970), (codified as amended at 23 U.S.C. §§ 142143, 215-216, 321 (1994)).
351
Pub. L. No. 102-240, 105 Stat. 1914 (1991) (codified at scattered sections of U.S.C.).
"
346
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sort of highways Congress sought to fund; they do not establish environmental protection as a purpose of highway funding. This is clearly distinguishable from the facts of Dole in which the federal statute calling upon
states to raise the drinking age echoed the explicit purposes of the federal
highway programs: safe highways.352
Another important distinction is the severity of the fmancial penalty to
which states would be subjected for failing to abide by congressional
dictates. Dole involved a modest (five percent) loss of highway funds. Yet
under the Clean Air Act, virtually all highway funds can be put at risk, with
minor exceptions for special uses. 353 Thus, even if the Clean Air Act's
sanctions are not facially suspect, it must be the case that the imposition of
sanctions could cross the line from inducement to coercion if enough
unrelated funds were at stake.354
In Brown, the Ninth Circuit noted that the formal existence of a
choice-such as the option to cease all timber sales from state lands-is
insufficient to make a federal program voluntary. 355 Similarly, in 1989, the
D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals struck down a conditional spending provision
for being unduly "coercive" because Congress sought to condition the
District of Columbia's appropriations upon the enactment of legislation to
exempt religious institutions from a sexual preference anti-discrimination
law. 356 In Clarke v. United States, the court held that "the severe consequences attendant to rejecting the amendment meant the Council members
were effectively coerced into not imposing it," in violation of their First
Amendment rights. 357 Citing numerous cases associated with the doctrine
of unconstitutional conditions, the court held that "the government may not
disregard the strictures of the Constitution when conferring discretionary
benefits."358

352
For a contrary view, see Laura Rapacioli, Note & Comment, Be Careful What You Ask For:
Attacking the Constitutionality of the Clean Air Act Operating Permit Program, 14 PACE ENVTI.. L.
REv. 323 (1996). But see William J. Klein, Note, Pressure or Compulsion? Federal Highway Fund
Sanctions of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, 26 RtiTGERS LJ. 855 (1995).
353
See 42 U.S.C. § 7509 (b)(l). The EPA may not cut off highway funds for projects necessary
to "resolve a demonstrated safety problem," mass transit, car pooling programs, construction of highoccupancy vehicle (HOV) lanes, "programs to limit or restrict vehicle use in downtown areas," and
other programs that will "improve air quality and would not encourage single occupancy vehicle
capacity." /d. § 7509 (b)(I)(B).
354
According to Stewart, "[s]uch a condition, accompanying funds which the state cannot afford
to forgo, intensifies federal interference with local mechanisms of political accountability by compelling
states to enforce against their constituencies restrictions the constituencies oppose." Stewart, supra note
41, at 1255.
"' Board of Natural Resources v. Brown, 992 F.2d 937, 947 (9th Cir. 1993).
356
Clarke v. United States 886 F.2d 404, 413 (D.C. Cir. 1989), vacated as nwot, 915 F.2d 699
(D.C. Cir. 1990). The court found that the conditional grant of funds violated D.C. legislators' First
Amendment guarantee of free expression.
357
!d. at 409.
358
ld. at 410. Among the cases cited by the court were Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970)
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Of course, the rights of states are not always upheld to the same degree
as those of individuals. In Nevada v. Skinner, decided just before Clarke,
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found that Congress could make ninetyfive percent of a state's highway funds conditional upon that state's setting
of a 55 miles-per-hour highway speed limit. 359 According to Judge
Reinhardt, the conditional grant of funds did not amount to "coercion" that
would "leave the state with no practical alternative but to comply with
federal restrictions." 360 This expansive view of Congress' conditional
spending power is at odds with the substance of Printz and New York.
Left unrestrained, Congress may use the conditional grant of federal
funds to achieve those ends that would otherwise be barred by the holdings
of New York, Lopez, and Printz. States receive federal grants for welfare,
environmental programs, highways, police, and many other purposes, and
are therefore quite reliant upon the national fisc. A federal recommendation
that states implement a desired program or risk losing federal support would
be quite compelling. Thus, the ultimate import of the Court's recent
federalist holdings may depend upon whether it opts to limit Congress'
ability to use conditional spending to bribe and compel state actions.
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF FEDERALIST JURISPRUDENCE ON ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICY

For the past twenty-five years, the federal government has played the
central role in the formulation, if not implementation, of environmental
policy. Even the cooperative federalism model presupposes active federal
oversight and direction of state efforts. The conventional policy presumption
is that the federal government has the primary responsibility for environmental protection. The revival of federalism, as symbolized by Printz
and other recent cases, suggests that this presumption needs to be reconsidered.
No doubt the extension of federalist jurisprudence into the environmental realm will be resisted in federal agencies, the legislature, and the
courts;361 federal judges are often willing to engage in policy-making from

(Congress may not condition grant of welfare benefits on waiver of due process rights), and Sherbert
v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (unemployment benefits may not be conditional on recipient's
willingness to work on Sabbath). For an overview of the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, and
one possible jurisprudential approach to it, see RICHARD EPSTEIN, BARGAINING WITH TilE STATE
(1993).
359
Nevada v. Skinner, 884 F.2d 445 (9th Cir. 1989).
"" Id. at 448.
361
Judicial reluctance to extend federalism jurisprudence into the environmental area is evident in
the Lopez-based challenges to federal environmental programs. See Cargill v. United States, 116 S. Ct
407 (I 995) (denial of certiorari) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (wetlands regulations upheld under Commerce

626

GEO. MASON L. REV.

[Vol. 6:3

the bench when the stakes are high.362 The presumption is that without
active federal involvement, there will be insufficient environmental protection. This view is misguided. There are few reasons to assume that, in the
1990s, environmental protection efforts must be centralized at the federal
level in order to be effective.
In practical terms, states are already responsible for the bulk of
environmental enforcement and policy implementation; 363 it is merely
priority setting from which they are excluded. Removing states from the
environmental picture is not possible. 364 Twenty years ago Richard Stewart
noted the "sobering fact is that environmental quality involves too many
intricate, geographically variegated physical and institutional interrelations
to be dictated from Washington."365 This is even more true today as
environmental policy is increasingly focused on smaller, more complex
problems which are tied to local conditions.
Three basic arguments were put forward to justify the federal
. government's entrance upon the environmental stage in the late 1960s and
early 1970s: (1) cross-boundary pollution ("spillovers"); (2) states' failure
or inability to provide for adequate environmental protection (economies of
scale); and (3) interstate competition (the "race-to-the-bottom"V66 Others
have suggested that national policies are more suited to the pursuit of moral
ideals, such as those which underlie environmentalism. 367 Similar arguClause); National Ass'n of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (Endangered
Species Act regulations upheld under Commerce Clause); United States v. Olin, 107 F.3d 1506 (lith
Cir. 1997) (Superfund regulations upheld under Commerce Clause). But see United States v. Wilson,
No. 96-4498, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 35971 (4th Cir. Dec. 23, 1997) (wetlands regulations invalidated
under Commerce Clause).
362
Indeed, the Printz dissent opens by praising the Brady Act as a "remarkable success" and a
wise public policy response to the "epidemic of gun violence." Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct 2365,
2386 (1997) (Stevens, J., dissenting). The federal government also appealed to these sentiments,
arguing ihat ihe Brady law should be upheld, inter alia, because it "serves very important purposes."
Printz;, 117 S. Ct at 2383. No doubt similar arguments would be marshaled to defend environmental
statutes from a federalism challenge.
363
See Tom Arrandale, Environment: Pollution Control Has Been Steadily Propelled Away from
Washington to the States, GoVERNING, Oct. 1997, at 36. The Environmental Council of the States
reports that states are responsible for over 85% of environmental enforcement actions and approximately 80% of environmental program expenditures. See Robert E. Roberts, Debunking the 'Race to the
Bottom' Myth, EcOSTATES, Nov. 1997, at 13.
364
No one has argued that state and local governments should be excluded altogether from
environmental policy. Some have argued, however, that governments generally should be excluded
from the formulation and enforcement of environmental policy, beyond the use of courts and other
dispute resolution mechanisms. See, e.g., TERRY ANDERSON & DoNALD LEAL, FREE MARKET
ENviRONMENTALISM (1991); Smith, A Critical Reappraisal, supra note 42; Fred L. Smith, Jr., A FreeMarket Environmental Program, 11 CATO J. 457 (1992); Fred L. Smith, Jr., The Market and Nature,
THE FREEMAN, Sept. 1993, at 352; Richard Stroup, Controlling Earth's Resources: Markets or Socialism?, POPULATION & ENV'T, Spring 1991, at 265.
365
Stewart, supra note 41, at 1266.
366
These arguments are summarized in Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95
MICH. L. REv. 570, 601-02 nn.101-03 (1996).
367
This argument is put forward in Stewart, supra note 41, at 1217-19. Stewart also suggests three
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ments are used today to defend the central place of the federal government
in environmental policy from calls for decentralization.368
Each of the arguments put forward in defense of national supremacy in
environmental policy is at least open to question, if not demonstrably false.
There is little reason to believe that genuine environmental protection will
suffer from judicially enforced limits on federal power. There are also
independent arguments for increasing state and local autonomy on environmental matters so as to encourage greater political accountability and
innovation in environmental policy. Courts should not seek to identify
public policy justifications for resisting the logical extension of federalism
jurisprudence into the environmental realm.
A.

Spillovers

Cross-boundary pollution, like any interstate externality, is a valid
concern in environmental policy. If State A can pollute State B without fear
of retribution, it has successfully externalized its environmental costs.
Absent some external controls or dispute resolution system, this situation
can lead to significant environmental harm. But the mere existence of such
externalities does not necessarily call for a centralized regulatory bureaucracy. There are other means of dealing with at least some spillover problems,
including compacts and regional authorities/ 69 and common law nuisance
actions. 370 Pollution tends to ignore political boundaries, but that does not
mean that every environmental problem is national. Where environmental
concerns are regional in scope, there is an argument for entrusting a
regionally-based entity or group with devisi.r1g a..11 adequate solution.371

other "structural factors" which hinder environmental quality on a decentralized basis which overlap
with the historical factors identified by Esty. They are (I) national economies of scale; (2) the disparate
under-representation of environmental interests at the state level; and (3) spillovers. See id. at 1211-17.
368
See, e.g., Sarnoff, supra note 302.
369
For instance, Congress authorized the Tahoe Regional Planning Compact between California
and Nevada in 1969, creating the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency which overseas the Lake Tahoe
basin. See Pub. L. No. 96-551, 94 Stat 3234 (1969). See also BRUCE YANDLE, COMMON SENSE AND
COMMON LAw FOR THE ENVIRONMENT 27, 57 (1997) (discussing the Ohio River Sanitation Commission).
370
See, e.g., ELizABETH BRUBAKER, PROPERTY RIGIITS IN DEFENSE OF NATURE (1995); Roger E.
Meiners, Elements of Property Rights: The Common Law Alternative, in LAND RIGIITS: THE 1990s
PROPERTY RIGIITS REBELUON (Bruce Yandle ed., 1995); Roger E. Meiners & Bruce Yandle, Clean
Water Legislation: Reauthorize or Repeal?, in TAKING THE ENVIRONMENT SERIOUSLY 88-93 (Bruce
Yandle & Roger E. Meiners eds., 1993).
371
It is also worth noting that while concerns about spillovers a..re generally accepted as an
explanation for the nationalization, many national statutes are more focused on intrastate pollution than
interstate pollution, and that even where federal rules address potential spillover effects, federal
enforcement has been less strict in the interstate context See Schoenbrod, supra note 49, at 260-61.
"Thus, the national takeover of environmental law must be defended, if it can be defended at all, on
the basis that Washington should regulate local pollution." /d. at 261.
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It should also be remembered that interstate pollution problems,
particularly those that are national in scope, are still the exception, not the
norm. 372 Most urban air pollution problems are local or regional, not
interstate. Houston's failure to meet the National Ambient Air Quality
Standard for ozone does not affect Baton Rouge, let alone Philadelphia.373
Drinking water systems serve the local communities in which they are
based. Superfund sites are local sites that rarely, if ever, impact other states.
Thus, even if one accepts the spillover argument for national environmental
regulation, it cannot be used to justify regulation in each and every
case.374

B.

Economies of Scale

Many states were engaged in environmental protection prior to the
1970s.375 Nonetheless, there were several reasons why concerns about
economies of scale encouraged the federal government to enter upon the
environmental stage. Relatively little was known about environmental policy
in the 1970s. Research and analysis were necessary to identify all but the
most obvious problems and solutions, so it seemed logical that centralizing
expertise would allow for a sound setting of priorities. Today, however, the
states spend more money on environmental matters and employ more
environmental bureaucrats than does the federal government. Research on
environmental issues has proliferated and is easily available through
research libraries and the Internet. Centralized expertise is no longer

372
This argument ignores "psychic" or aesthetic spillovers, such as when one jurisdiction allows
for economic development that offends the environmental values of those in another jurisdiction, as
would occur if one state allows the cutting of trees on land deemed a pristine wilderness by outsiders.
It is questionable whether the federal government should regulate based upon such concerns and, if it
does, how the proper measure of such regulation is determined. For instance, the use of "contingent
valuation" or other means of indirectly measuring the psychic, aesthetic, or even religious value placed
upon such environmental amenities is fraught with difficulty. See, e.g., Robert H. Nelson, Does "Existence Value" Exist?--Environmental Economics Encroaches on Religion, lNDEP. REv., Spring 1997,
at 499.
m Of course, in some parts of the country, particularly the Northeast, air pollution is a regional
interstate problem. Air pollution in Philadelphia, for example, significantly impacts air quality across
the river in Camden, New Jersey. However, such regional problems do not make the case for national
intervention.
374
Esty makes the argument that U.S. environmental policy should be infonned by the idea of
subsidiarity. That is to say that each environmental problem should be dealt with by the level of
government-local, state, national, international-best positioned to address that particular concern:
"the challenge is to find the best fit possible between environmental problems and regulatory
responses-not to pick a single level of government for all problems." Esty, supra note 366, at 574
(citation omitted).
375
See, e.g., Karol Ceplo & Bruce Yandle, Western States and Environmental Federalism: An
fuamination of Institutional Viability, in ENVIRONMENTAL FEDERALISM 225-57 (Terry Anderson &
Peter J. Hill eds., 1997).
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necessary; it can actually be counterproductive. As noted below, the record
shows that some states may even have a thing or two to teach the federal
government.376
In addition, the local and regional nature of many environmental
problems means that local knowledge and expertise is necessary to develop
proper solutions.377 Such localized knowledge is inevitably beyond the
reach of even the most intrepid federal regulators. 378 The most effective
and equitable strategy for controlling ozone ("smog") precursors will vary
from city to city based upon the local mix of stationary and mobile sources,
the relative age of the automobile fleet, and dominant weather conditions,
for example. One-size-fits-all can very easily become one-size-fits-nobody.
Moreover, when policies are nationalized, it can become difficult for those
communities which suffer disproportionately from policy errors or omissions to get their concerns addressed. 379 Indeed, it is possible to conclude,
like Butler and Macey, that "whatever the economies of scale associated
with the centralization of environmental policy, they are surely overwhelmed by the diseconomies of scale in centralized administration. "380
While states are typically characterized as having done too little to
address environmental concerns, some have suggested that at least a few
states may have done too much. It is certainly arguable that national
corporate interests may have preferred uniform national standards to the
patchwork of state standards which was emerging at the time the federal
environmental regime was erected.381 Given the extent of special-interest

376

See infra Part IV.C.

3

n "The enviiunmental ha.-m caused by the emission of the sa1ne R!TIO!!!!t of pollution can vary
widely, depending on local environmental conditions." HENRY N. BUlLER & JONATHAN R. MACEY,

27 (1996).
Ecological central planning, while perhaps more well-intentioned, is no more conceivable to
implement than economic central planning, not least because of what Nobel laureate F.A. Hayek
termed the "knowledge problem." See Hayek, supra note 44, at 519-30. This point is also made by
Butler and Macey: "Federal regulators never have been and never will be able to acquire and assimilate
the enormous amount of information necessary to make optimal regulatory judgments that reflect the
technical requirements of particular locations and pollution sources." BUlLER & MACEY , supra note
377, at 27.
379
This concern for political accountability was an issue for the court in Printz. See supra Part
D.C.
3
"' BUlLER & MACEY, supra note 377, at 27.
381
See, e.g., E. Donald Elliott et al., Toward a Theory of Statutory Evolution: The Federalization
of Environmental Law, 1 J.L. EcON. & ORG. 313, 326-29 (1985). In the early 1960s, Lloyd Cutler
reportedly recommended that national auto manufacturers support granting the federal government
authority to set national vehicle emission standards to preempt state standards. "He reasoned that the
companies would be able to keep the secretary [of Health Education and Welfare] from imposing
expensive pollution reduction measures ...." Schoenbrod, supra note 49, at 261. Congress authorized
federal standards in 1965, and preempted state standards in 1967. See id.
For modem examples of this phenomenon in the air pollution policy context, see Jonathan Adler,
Watching Paint Dry, REG., 1995 No.4, at 23 (national paint manufacturers seek national evaporative
emission standards that will hurt regional, specialty paint manufacturers), and Jones & Adler, supra
USING FEDERALISM TO IMPROVE ENviRONMENTAL POUCY
378
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manipulation of environmental policy / 82 this argument cannot be rejected
out of hand.
C.

The "Race-to-the-Bottom"

The "race-to-the-bottom" argument is rather straightforward: Faced
with the prospect of competition from other states, states will lower their
environmental standards to attract and retain corporate investment. As
Stewart suggested, "[i]f each locality reasons the same way, all will adopt
lower standards of environmental quality than they would prefer if there
were some binding mechanism that enabled them simultaneously to enact
higher standards, thus eliminating the threatened loss of industry or development."383 This argument is also flawed. 384
There is a fundamental conceptual problem with the "race-to-thebottom" argument, for it assumes that any change to existing environmental
standards or regulations which makes them less onerous and burdensome
must necessarily come· at the expense of environmental protection and
overall social welfare. This presumption is unfounded. Given the strong
public support for environmental protection, it is just as likely that states
will compete on both economic and environmental grounds. Under this
model, state legislators and executive officials will seek out innovative ways
of making environmental programs more flexible, predictable and efficient,
without compromising environmental quality. 385
Empirical evidence suggests this is actually the case in this country.
First, it is not uncommon for states to exceed federal regulatory requirements when there is a particularly acute environmental concern. 386 Accordnote 304, at 23-25 (national auto manufacturers seek imposition of low-emission vehicle standard in all
states except California as alternative to a regional standard imposed in the northeastern United States).
382
See, e.g., Adler, Reni-Seeking, supra note 205, at 26; see generally ENVIRONMENTAL POUTICS,
supra note 205.
"" Stewart, supra note 41, at 1212. It is interesting to note that the "race-to-the-bottom" argument
is fundamentally at odds with the contention advanced by some that environmental regulations do not
entail significant environmental cost If environmental regulations are so costly that no state will implement them alone because the regulatory cost will drive away economic development, then surely
environmental controls are a significant cost of doing business. Conversely, if the cost of environmental
regulations is substantially overblown, as some environmentalists contend, then there is no fear of a
"race-to-the-bottom" absent the creation of a federal floor.
384
See generally Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the "Raceto-the-Bonom" Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1210 (1992).
3
"' Revesz points out that it is wrong to assume that competition between states necessarily
produces less stringent pollution controls and that reducing such controls is always socially undesirable.
See Revesz, supra note 384, at 1219. One could only make these assumptions if one were to equate
environmental protection with the promulgation of regulations rather than with direct measures of
environmental quality.
386
See, e.g., Dana C. Joel, Rhetoric vs. Reality: New Jersey Regulatory Reform, REG., 1996 No.
2, at 53. "A state where regulations frequently exceed federal requirements, New Jersey contains some
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ing to Robbie Roberts of the Environmental Council of the States, "[a]lmost
every State has some area where it has either adopted a standard higher
than the federal standard or adopted a standard in an area where there was
no federaJ standard."387 Second, despite the dominant federal role in most
pollution-control matters, many states are seeking to create business-friendly
environments through administrative reforms that will not compromise
environmental protection.
Despite extensive federal involvement in environmental policy, many
states have become green "laboratories of democracy,"388 experimenting
with new ways of advancing environmental protection. 389 For instance,
forty states have their own hazardous waste site cleanup programs. The
performance of these programs compares favorably with the federal program; states are cleaning up hazardous waste sites faster and less expensively than the federal government. 390 Side-by-side comparisons of state and
federal forests are even more striking. National forests lose money on
timber sales and have a poor record of environmental protection; state
forests, such as those in Montana, tum a profit and have superior environmental performance.391 While the environmental policy debate centers
on Washington, states are developing the next generation of environmental
policies from air quality to park management. 392 A judicial reinvigoration
of federalism can only serve to further invigorate the experimentation and
innovation that is going on at the state level.
If it were demonstrably true that most states would lower their environmental standards in order to attract industry, then there would be a
potential case for federal standards. But this downward pressure cannot justify extensive federal mandates directing states to administer particular
programs in a particular fashion. Yet that is the dominant model of "cooperative federalism" in use today. This is further evidence that the Printz
decision and the revival of state autonomy do not threaten environmental
protection so much as they may threaten the existing federal approach to
environmental policy.

of the most costly regulations in the nation." Id. at 55.
387
Roberts, supra note 363, at 14.
388
New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
389
See, e.g., David L. Markell, States as Inrwvators: It's Time for a New Look to Our "Laboratories of Democracy" in the Effort to Improve Our Approach to Environmental Regulation, 58 ALB. L.
REv. 347 (1994).
390
See J. Winston Porter, Cleaning Up Superfund: The Case for State Environmental Leadership,
REAsON FOUND. POL'Y STUDY 195 (1995).
3
See Donald Leal, Turning a Profit on Public Forests, PERc POUCY SERIES PS-4 (1995).
"
392
A catalog of state-level innovations in environmental policy can be found on the Environmental
Council of the States' web site, Innovative Ideas (visited Feb. 12, 1998)
<http://www.sso.orglecoslinnovate.htm>. This list would be significantly more extensive were it not for
the obstructions posed by federal mandates. "State-by-state experiment ... disappears with federal
mandates. Yet experiment is what we need." Schoenbrod, supra note 49, at 264.
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What Do People Want?

These are not the only arguments suggesting that a devolution of
authority over environmental policy making can and should occur in the
wake of Printz. There is no doubt that most Americans consider themselves
to be environmentalists, but there is no longer uniform agreement as to
what "environmentalism" means (if there ever was). 393 There are conservationists and preservationists, those who recognize nature's instrumental
value and those who appreciate its intrinsic worth. Some want to actively
restore ecosystems and landscapes, other would like as much of the world
as possible left alone. With all these differences, there is certainly an
argument to be made for allowing environmental pluralism. Indeed, many
of the grass-roots criticisms of environmental policy, from both the left and
the right, tacitly call for a return of power closer to home. 394
The public's broad support for environmental protection is often
confused with public support of existing policies, in particular, and an
extensive federal role in environmental policy more generally. Joshua
Sarnoff, for instance, writes that "the data strongly and consistently indicate
that a 'supermajority' of the national voting public continues to support
preserving and even expanding the traditional federal role in protecting the
environment."395 This is only the case if one conflates support for current
or increased levels of environmental protection with federal action. When
voters are given the choice as to which level of government they would
prefer to direct environmental policy, they almost invariably choose state
and local governments over the federal government. For instance, in a 1996
national survey of registered voters, sixty-five percent of those surveyed felt
that state or local government was better at environ.'llental protection, and
large majorities agreed that state or local government should have the
"primary responsibility" for protecting water quality and should determine
which air pollution control measures are enacted.3% Rightly or wrongly,
a substantial number of Americans believe there is nothing incompatible
with the devolution of power and environmental protection.

393
Some of the various approaches are discussed in ADLER, ENviRONMENTAUSM supra note 12,
ch. 6. See also MARK DOWIE, LoSING GROUND (1995); WALLACE KAUFMAN, NO TURNING BACK: DISMANTLING TilE FANTASIES OF ENVIRONMENTAL THINKING (1994); MARTIN LEWIS, GREEN DELUSIONS:
AN ENVIRONMENTAUST CRiTIQUE OF RADICAL ENviRONMENTAUSM (1992).
394
This is particularly evident with the environmental justice movement and the property rights
and "wise-use" movements. See ADLER, ENvlRONMENTAUSM, supra note 12, ch. 6.
395
Sarnoff, supra note 302, at 319 n.3l.
396
THE POLLING Co., supra note 66, at 8, 10.
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CONCLUSION

If the Court adheres to the principles it enunciated in Printz, the
federalist revival will spread. With renewed judicial vigilance against overreaching congressional enactments will come increased accountability within
the political process. As the Court noted, whether state and local governments are forced to pay the costs of implementing federal programs or not,
they often take the blame for the burdensomeness of programs designed in
Washington, D.C. 397 For this reason, the federal government's ability to
direct state and local governments must be proscribed. This concern for
accountability in the federal system is as acute in the environmental arena
as any, if not more so. The proliferation of codes, standards, and agencies
at all levels of government has short-circuited accountability in environmental policy. 398
Federalism's return to the Supreme Court's focus should be welcomed,
even in the realm of environmental policy. Adhered to by federal courts, the
federalist revival will accelerate the reformulation of environmental policy
for the next century. They offer the opportunity to reawaken state experimentation and revisit the nationalisi assumptions underlying contemporary
environmental policy.
Opponents of federal gun control may have cheered the loudest when
the Brady Act was declared unconstitutional, but the green aspects of Printz
may yet prove to be the sweetest. 399

Jonathan H. Adler*

397
3
"'
399

See Printz v. United States, 117 S. CL 2365, 2382 (1997).
See Schoenbrod, supra note 49, at 264.
With further apologies to the Bard, see supra note 1.
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